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On November 12, 1984, the New York Times reported the arrest
of Thomas Tcimpidis,' a Los Angeles electronic bulletin board2
operator whose system allegedly was being used by "phone phreaks" 3
* Assistant General Counsel, New York City Department of General Services;
Suffolk University Law School, J.D., 1981; Colgate University, B.A., 1978.
1. Pollack, Free-Speech Issues Surround Computer Bulletin Board Use, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 12, 1984, at Al, col. 1; see also Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1984, at 33;
INFOWORLD, July 2, 1984, at 15.
2. An electronic bulletin board is a computer file which is accessible to sub-
scribers' home computers through a telephone connection. Presently there are several
thousand in operation, providing a medium for the exchange of information to
computer enthusiasts. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1984, at D4, col. 3. Some of the
bulletin boards are integrated with national information services such as CompuServe
and The Source, discussed infra note 67 and accompanying text. An increasing
number of others, however, are run by computer hobbyists and are open to all
callers. Id. See Hansen, Electronic Messaging. PC TECH J., Feb. 1985, at 141 for
a detailed discussion of the operation of one public access bulletin board system.
These systems provide a nationwide communications network which is invisible to
the majority of the American public. Thomas Tcimpidis took advantage of this
network after his arrest by alerting computer users all over the country of his
plight within three days of his arrest. Pollack, Free-Speech Issues Surround Computer
Bulletin Board Use, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1984, at D4, col. 4. He also secured
the counsel of a computer lawyer to assist in his defense. POPULAR COMPUTING,
June 1985, at 76, 144.
The underground networks, however, also have less benign ramifications. In
June, 1984, the New York Times reported the electronic bulletin board posting of
a stolen credit agency computer password. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1984, at DI.
Although no thefts were reported as a result of this incident, ninety million credit
histories may have been jeopardized. Id. More ominous, are recent reports of the
use of electronic bulletin boards by an Idaho-based neo-Nazi organization to
distribute its literature in Canada and apprise interstate members of subversive
activities. King, 20 Held in 7 States in Sweep of Nazis Arming for 'War' on U.S.,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, at A20, col. 1.
3. "Phone Phreaks" specialize in making telephone calls without paying, and
frequently use electronic bulletin boards, described supra note 2, to distribute stolen
credit card numbers. Perry & Wallich, Can Computer Crime be Stopped?, IEEE
SPECTRUM 34, 37 (May 1984) (brief case study of phone phreak) [hereinafter cited
as Perry & Wallich]. In the Tcimpidis case, Pacific Bell Telephone Company initiated
the investigation into the stolen credit card numbers which ultimately led to the
system operator's arrest. Pollack, Free-Speech Issues Surround Computer Bulletin
Board Use, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1984, at D4, col. 2; see also Perry & Wallich,
supra, at 39.
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to post stolen telephone credit card numbers. 4 The Los Angeles
Police Department confiscated Tcimpidis' computer equipment, and
the county district attorney charged him with the misdemeanor of
"knowingly and willfully publishing" the stolen numbers.'
While the legal liability of the "phone phreaks" or "hackers," '6
who infiltrate boards like that operated by Tcimpidis, has become
increasingly clear as numerous states pass computer crime legislation,'
4. By posting the stolen numbers, the phone phreaks, supra note 3, enable
any board user to anonymously charge any telephone call to the cardholder's
number. This usage is consistent with what is viewed as one of the classic motivations
of the computer criminal, that is, the desire "to play Robin Hood [and rob] the
government, telephone company or other large impersonal [organization.]" Sokolik,
Computer Crime-The Need for Deterrent Legislation, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 353, 367
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Deterrent Legislation]; D. PARKER, CRIME BY COMPUTER,
(1976) [hereinafter cited as PARKER].
5. Pollack, Free-Speech Issues Surround Computer Bulletin Board Use, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 12, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
6. A hacker is "a person with computer expertise intrinsically interested in
the exploration of computer systems and their capabilities." Perry & Wallich, supra
note 3, at 37. See generally S. LEVY, HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REV-
OLUTION (1984) [hereinafter cited as LEVY]. More recently, the term has come to
mean computer abusers, that is, those who seek to gain unauthorized access to a
computer system. Perry & Wallich, supra note 3, at 37. The recently reported case
of the 414's in Milwaukee, in which a group of high school students broke into
numerous computer systems purely for the thrill of it, presents a classic hacker
scenario. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1983, at A30, col. 1. The students used information
obtained from a local electronic bulletin board, supra note 2, and combined it
with a minimal degree of computer proficiency to access various systems in this
country and in Canada. Id. Those students who were apprehended stated that they
had no idea they were doing anything wrong. Id. See PARKER, supra note 4, at
41 for a more complete description of the role of the hacker in computer crime.
7. Sullivan & Shaw, Criminal Penalties for Misappropriation of Computer
Technology, 2 COMPUTER LAWYER 19 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Penalties].
Since 1979, when Florida became the first state to enact computer legislation, FLA.
STAT. §§ 815.01-.07 (Supp. 1985), thirty-three other states have acknowledged the
weaknesses of their penal laws and passed specific computer crime bills. See
Raysman, Computer Law, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 8, 1985, at 1, col. I [hereinafter cited
as Raysman]. The federal government followed suit in 1984, enacting The Counterfeit
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
Title II, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (1984). Raysman, supra, at 1. See Criminal
Penalties, supra, for a comprehensive overview of existing state and federal computer
crime statutes. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESOURCE MANUAL (1979) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCE
MANUAL].
Computer abuse may be defined as "any intentional act associated in any way
with computers where a victim suffered, or could have suffered, a loss, and a
perpetrator made, or could have made, a gain." Parker, Computer Abuse Research
Update, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 329, 333 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Computer Abuse
Research Update]. There are four generally accepted classifications of computer
crime: (1) introduction of fraudulent records or data into a computer system; (2)
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the Tcimpidis case appears to be the first in which the legal liability
of the system operator' is at issue.
unauthorized use of a computer or computer-related facilities; (3) alteration of
computerized information or files; and (4) theft by electronic means of money,
financial instruments, property, services or valuable data. See Note, Computer
Abuse: The Emerging Crime and the Need for Legislation, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
73, 74-75 (1984). Recent surveys estimate that the annual loss to American businesses
from computer related crimes is $3 billion, with 25% of responding companies
acknowledging that they were victimized by computer criminals. Crime Pays, DA-
TAMATION, Sept. 15, 1984, at 72.
Although one commentator has argued that computer crime is nothing more
than a standard crime which happens to involve a computer, Taber, On Computer
Crime, 1 COMPUTER L.J. 517, 537 (1979), most experts agree that computer abuse
presents a difficult and unique set of penal issues to the state or federal prosecutor.
See Gemignani, Computer Crime: The Law in '80, 13 IND. L. REV. 681 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as The Law in '80]; Deterrent Legislation, supra note 4; Note,
A Suggested Legislative Approach to the Problem of Computer Crime, 38 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1173 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Suggested Legislative Approach].
The major problem in prosecuting computer crime is the difficulty of applying
traditional penal laws to new technology. See Comment, Computer Crime-Senate
Bill S.240, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 660, 661-62 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Computer
Crime]. As a result, most early cases had to be "shoe horned" into criminal
categories which were inappropriate, and which were not designed to accomodate
the special evidentiary and sentencing problems presented by computer crimes. See,
e.g., United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922
(1978) (unauthorized access to and misappropriation of computer program prosecuted
under federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, when interstate telephone lines
were used to transmit computer program signals); Lund v. Commonwealth, 217
Va. 688, 232 S.E.2d 745 (1977) (unauthorized use of computer time held not to
constitute Virginia crimes of false pretenses or larceny); Ward v. Superior Ct., 3
Comp. L. Serv. Rep. 206 (1972) (electronic impulses representing stolen computer
program held not to constitute tangible article under California theft statute). See
also the case of Jerry Schneider reported in PARKER, supra note 4, at 59-70.
Schneider allegedly stole millions of dollars of telephone equipment from Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Company through a sophisticated computer scam. He
served forty days in jail, paid a $500 fine, and made restitution in the amount of
$8,500. He reportedly now earns over $100,000 per year as a computer security
consultant. Id. at 68. See generally McLaughlin, Computer Crime: The Ribicoff
Amendment to the United States Code, Title 18, 2 CRIM. JUST. J. 217, 224 (1979).
8. The system operator, or sysop in the current jargon, manages the central
computer which users access and through which they post messages. See Pollack,
Free-Speech Issues Surround Computer Bulletin Board Use, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12,
1984, at D4, col. 1. The operator may generate information himself or may contract
for it with "information providers" such as advertisers, wire services, government
agencies or other publishers. Neustadt, Skall & Hammer, The Regulation of Elec-
tronic Publishing, 33 FED. COM. L.J. 331, 334 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Regulation
of Electronic Publishing]. In some operations, such as Knight-Ridder's Viewtron bulletin
board, discussed infra notes 68 & 73, the corporate system operator considers itself
responsible for all messages on the system, screening material and deleting obscene
messages as well as those judged to be in poor taste. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1984,
at D4, col. 1. Other services, such as CompuServe and The Source, infra note 67,
do not screen messages or monitor them with any regularity. N.Y. Times, June
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The Tcimpidis case raises significant questions about the regulation
of electronic publishing, 9 a field which encompasses bulletin boards
like Tcimpidis', as well as on-line information services, electronic
mail and teletext and videotext technologies. Foremost among these ques-
tions is the relationship between the new electronic media and the first
22, 1984, at D4. Following Tcimpidis' arrest, see supra text accompanying notes
1-8, his bulletin board advised all users that "illegal, obscene or abusive messages
... will not be tolerated." Id. Whether or not such a message would protect a
system operator from any or all legal liability under the existing law is not yet
clear.
Depending on whether the medium is viewed as a common carrier, see infra
notes 279-308 and accompanying text, broadcasting, see infra notes 185-272 and
accompanying text, or electronic newspaper, see infra notes 135-81 and accompanying
text, the sysop may be prohibited, required, or permitted to exercise control over
the content of the messages conveyed.
9. Electronic publishing has also been defined as "the provision of any in-
formation which a provider or publisher has, or has caused to be originated,
authored, compiled, collected, or edited, or in which he has a direct or indirect
financial or proprietary interest, and which is disseminated to an unaffiliated person
through some electronic means." United States v. AT&T, Co., 552 F. Supp. 131,
181 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 1240 (1983). Included within this definition
are two-way interactive transaction services transmitted via pay television, radio and
television broadcasting. Id. at 181 nn.207-08; see infra note 13. Electronic publishing
is also used generically to describe teletext and videotext information distribution
services. Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note 8, at 332. See infra notes
29-74 and accompanying text for a description of teletext and videotext. Electronic
publishing has been defined as "[s]ystems for the widespread dissemination of text
and graphic information by wholly electronic means for display on low-cost terminals
under the selective control of the recipient, using control procedures easily understood
by untrained users." Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note 8, at 332 n.l,
citing M. TYLER, ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING: A SKETCH OF THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
(1980) (unpublished manuscript distributed by Institute for the Future).
Electronic publishing is to be distinguished from the electronic newsrooms of
technologically astute journalists who have substituted computer video display ter-
minals for paper and typewriters, but who have also maintained traditional roles
with respect to news compilation and distribution. BROADCASTING, Jan. 21, 1985,
at 92.
Also excluded from the limits of electronic publishing, for purposes of this
Article, are continuous news presentations on cable television channels and the use
of over-the-air broadcasting, satellite relays and telephone wires by national news-
papers to transmit their editions to printing presses throughout the country, as well
as audiotex systems which use the telephone wires to aurally transmit data and
which include the Dial-it services that provide time, sports scores and weather along
with more sophisticated interactive information retrievals. See Pollack, Audiotex:
Data By Telephone, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1984, at D2, col. 1; Blain, Audiotex
Phone Service Available Soon in D.C., TELEPHONY, Mar. 4, 1985, at 85; see also
Nadel, A Unified Theory of the First Amendment: Divorcing the Medium from




amendment, which guarantees freedom of speech and of the press.'"
This Article addresses some of the questions which arise out of
the Tcimpidis case." Part II provides an introduction to electronic
publishing: teletext, 2 videotext, 3 the subcategories of electronic mail 4
and electronic bulletin boards, 5 as well as the related technology
10. See generally Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "New Media"-New
Directions in Regulating Telecommunications, 31 FED. Com. L.J. 201 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as Bazelon]; Stern, Krasnow & Senkowski, The New Video Marketplace
and the Search for a Coherent Regulatory Philosophy, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 529
(1983) [hereinafter cited as The New Video Marketplace]; Legal Issues in Electronic
Publishing: Videotext Symposium, 36 FED. COM. L.J. 217 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Videotext Symposium].
11. The major question raised by the Tcimpidis case concerns the responsibility
for information provided over electronic publishing facilities, particularly if the
publication is defamatory, obscene or criminal. If bulletin boards and their related
technology are considered common carrier information distributors, such as telephone
companies, the bulletin board operator would not be responsible for the content
of the information conveyed. See infra notes 303-09 and accompanying text. If,
however, the bulletin board is viewed as a form of electronic newspaper, then the
operator would be liable for the material published in the same manner as the
traditional press. See infra notes 135-81 and accompanying text. The question of
whether print, common carrier or broadcasting is the most appropriate classification
for electronic publishers will be explored throughout this Article.
12. Teletext is a one-way information distribution service whereby data is trans-
mitted from a central computer to a subscriber's terminal using broadcast, cable
or microwave technology. See Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note 8,
at 332; infra notes 29-53 and accompanying text.
13. Videotext is a two-way information distribution service whereby the subscriber
can respond to, as well as receive, the transmitted data, and execute service
transactions via cable or telephone technology. Regulation of Electronic Publishing,
supra note 8, at 333; see infra notes 54-74 and accompanying text. Commentators
differ on the approriate terms in this area: teletex versus teletext, and videotex
versus videotext or viewdata. See Videotext Symposium, supra note 10, at 149.
For consistency of application, the increasingly accepted spellings, 'teletext' and
'videotext,' as discussed infra notes 29-74, will be used throughout this Article.
14. Electronic mail is a method of electronically transmitting a message from
an individual at one computer terminal to someone at another terminal, via a
routing mechanism contained in a central or "host" computer. More accurately
described as a computer based message, rather than a mail, system, the technology
is generally viewed as a substitute for short telephone calls rather than for the
postal system. To use electronic mail, a subscriber accesses his computer, locates
the "mailing address" of the subscriber to whom the communication will be directed,
then types in the message and directs the system to transmit it. Existing services
include MCI Mail, ITT Dialcom, Compuserve, The Source, GTE's Telemail, Tym-
share's On Tyme, and Western Union's Easylink. See 71 A.B.A. J. 96 (1985);
INFOWORLD, July 2, 1984, at 28; MICRO COM., Feb. 1985, at 36; Nat'l L.J., Feb.
4, 1985, at 15.
15. See supra note 2.
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of home banking. 16 Part III examines the digital electronics 7 rev-
olution which gave birth to these new media and considers the
technology from a historical perspective. 8 Part IV reviews the in-
16. Home banking is a transactional form of videotext which enables subscribers
to conduct electronic fund transfers through their home computers. EFT REP.,
May 23, 1984, at 4-6 [hereinafter cited as EFT REP.]. See generally Connors, The
Implementation of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act: An Update on Regulation
E, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 329 (1981). For a listing of articles pertaining to
Electronic Fund Transfers, see Electronic Fund Transfer Bibliography-Update, 9
RUTGERS J. OF COMPUTERS AND THE LAW 403 (1983). One of the first banks to
offer home banking services was New York's Chemical Bank, which initiated the
"Pronto" system in September 1983. EFT REP., supra, at 6. Subscribers pay $12
per month for the system which is compatible with Apple, Atari and IBM personal
computers. Pronto is currently used by approximately 5000 Chemical bank customers,
although expansion is anticipated as the system develops into an all-encompassing
home financial services system. Id. In addition to providing bill paying, funds
transfer, balance inquiry, electronic statements, home budgeting, and checkbook
reconciliation services, Pronto offers a securities trading service to its subscribers
through "Trade*Plus," a California financial information firm. Id. at 5. When a
customer enters a buy or sell transaction, the message goes instantly to the Trade*Plus
host computer via Chemical's Pronto mainframe. The Trade*Plus computer sends
the information to a discount broker who executes the order and sends a trade
confirmation back to the subscriber's terminal. Id. at 5-6. Additionally, Chemical
Bank licenses the Pronto system to other banks, thereby enabling the bank to raise
revenue and participate more fully in the videotext market. Id. at 6.
17. Digital electronics is the system upon which almost all modern computing
applications are based. Digital computers are basically counting devices that operate
on discrete data or numbers. COUGAR & McFADDEN, A FIRST COURSE IN DATA
PROCESSING 52 (1977) [hereinafter cited as COUGAR & McFADDEN]. The data are
represented by binary signals (zeros and ones) called bits, which may be processed
within a single computer or transmitted to various remote computer sites over the
telephone. This transmission is carried out by the use of a modem which translates
the computer digital pulse into an analog wave form capable of being carried by
telephone copper wires. Id. Digital computers can accurately process sequential
operations on these data in a wide variety of business applications. Taetzsch,
Computer Basics, INFORMATION PLUS No. 120 (1982).
Digital computers are contrasted to analog computers which use continuous, rather
than unconnected, signals. Analog computers operate by establishing a physical
analogy between the computer system and the system being studied. In re Amendment
of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer
Inquiry), 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 669, 694 n.33 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Computer
Il]. Analog computers are most frequently used for manufacturing applications,
where continuously operating variables such as temperature, pressure or speed are
analyzed. COUGAR & McFADDEN, supra, at 52.
The legal problems which arise in the area of electronic publishing are the result
of the confluence of traditional and regulated analog communications, such as
telephones, with digital computers which are used for information processing and
enhanced transmission functions and do not neatly fit into any previously defined
regulatory category. Computer Services Inquiry, 18 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1713,
1719 (1970).
18. See infra notes 75-126 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XIII
ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING
terplay between the first amendment and the existing regulatory
models of the press, broadcasting, common carriers and cablecasting.' 9
Of particular concern will be the areas of content regulation,2"
defamation,2 and obscenity.22 In parts V and VI, this Article concludes
by proposing a regulatory approach to the new electronic communica-
tions based on extrapolations from the existing media models, and sug-
gests guidelines for implementing a coherent national telecommunica-
tions policy.2 3
19. See infra notes 127-309 and accompanying text.
20. Content regulation of various media has been justified as an acceptable
abridgement of first amendment rights when issues such as obscenity, privacy,
defamation and criminal incitement are raised. See, e.g., Time v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374 (1967) (privacy); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity);
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (libel); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315 (1951) (criminal incitement); Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 43
Cal. App. 3d 880, 118 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1974) (privacy). Content regulation in the
broadcasting context represents the most pervasive involvement of the government
in the control of any medium of expression protected by the first amendment. See,
e.g., Communications Act of 1934 § 315 (Fairness Doctrine).
In broadcasting, Government power is used to shape and direct the
content of programming toward various social ends by requiring, or
indirectly coercing, the presentation of various types of information and
programming in the name of the public interest .... It is only in the
broadcast media that the First Amendment has been interpreted to permit
governmental efforts to foster the expression of certain ideas or infor-
mation by intruding upon the creation, selection, and editing functions
of the private media owners.
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CABINET COMM. ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 23
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1974) (cited in Goldberg & Couzens, "Peculiar Char-
acteristics": An Analysis of the First Amendment Implications of Broadcast Reg-
ulation, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg & Couzens]).
The most infamous form of broadcasting regulation is the Fairness Doctrine, codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982), discussed infra note 196.
21. Defamation is: (a) the making of a false and defamatory statement about
another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting to
at least negligence by the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement
regardless of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 558 (1977) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT-
TORTS]. See infra notes 147-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of defamation.
22. "Obscene" means
that to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the pre-
dominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to the prurient
interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion,
which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description
or representation of such matters.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 17 n.l (1973). Obscene material is not protected
by the first amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See infra
notes 174-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of obscenity law.
23. See infra notes 310-81 and accompanying text.
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II. Introduction to Electronic Publishing
Electronic publishing is a generic term used to describe the pro-
viding of information of any sort to consumers by electronic means.2 4
Text or graphic data is created or compiled in a central computer
by a system operator and transmitted over airwaves or through cable
or telephone wires to subscribers who receive and display it on a
television or computer screen. 25 By combining the technology of data
processing 26 and telecommunications,2 7 electronic publishers can pro-
vide customers with a wide variety of information services.28
A. Teletext Technology
One-way data transmission, known as teletext, 29 operates by con-
veying information from the host computer to the subscriber as a
continuous cycle of data.3 0 The subscriber requests a particular page
24. R. NEUSTADT, THE BIRTH OF ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING 5-24 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as NEUSTADT]; see also Beck, Control of, and Access to, On-Line Com-
puter Data Base: Some First Amendment Issues in Videotex and Teletex, 5 CoMM/ENT
1 (Fall 1982); Branscomb, Electronic Publishing: A Global View of Videotex, 36 FED.
COM. L.J. 119 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Global View].
25. NEUSTADT, supra note 24, at 5, 10.
26. Data processing is the use of a computer for operations such as storing,
retrieving, sorting, merging and calculating data according to programmed instruc-
tions. Computer Services Inquiry, 18 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1713, 1719 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Computer 1].
27. Telecommunications, which originally included only telegraph and telephone
facilities, now encompass all forms of electronically transmitted communications.
See generally J. MARTIN, FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 28 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as MARTIN]; see also PIERCE, SIGNALS: THE TELEPHONE AND BEYOND
(1981) [hereinafter cited as PIERCE].
28. See supra notes 2, 14 & 16 and infra notes 29-74 and accompanying text.
29. See Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note 8, at 332. Teletext was
originally defined by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as "a data
system associated with a television broadcast signal that is used for the transmission
of textual and graphic information intended for display on the screens of suitably
equipped receivers." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (BC Docket No. 81-741), 46
Fed. Reg. 60,851, 60,856 (1981) (codified at 47 C.F.R. Part 73) (proposed Dec.
14, 1981). In 1983, the FCC defined it as "a data system for the transmission of
textual and graphic information intended for display on viewing screens." In re
Amendment of Parts 2, 73 and 76 of the Commission's Rules to Authorize the
Transmission of Teletext by TV Stations, 53 RAD REG. 2d (P & F) 1309, 1320
(1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Teletext Order]. The Order, however, examines
teletext only with respect to its narrowband broadcast component, ignoring the
technical capabilities of full channel microwave teletext and cable transmissions of
on-line teletext services. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. A more
appropriate definition would view teletext as "one-way electronic publishing trans-
missions," utilizing the Tyler definition of electronic publishing. See supra note 9.
30. See Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note 8, at 332-33.
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of data through a remote terminal, which "grabs" the page as it
goes by in the data cycle, 3 ' and presents the information on the terminal
screen.
Teletext can be transmitted over four different media: television
or radio frequency, microwave or cable.32 Presently, teletext is most
frequently transmitted over the "narrowband" 33 vertical blanking
interval (VBI)34 of the television screen.35 The VBI is that portion
of the television signal generally viewed as a black line when the
picture is rolled and which represents the period required for the
signal to return from the top of the screen to the bottom. Without
a decoder, the VBI teletext would be indecipherable.3 6
31. Id.; NEUSTADT, supra note 24, at 5.
32. See Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note 8, at 336; NEUSTADT,
supra note 24, at 11-13.
33. Narrowband, as opposed to full channel broadband service, utilizes only a
portion of the broadcast signal, and transmits only a few thousand bits of data
per second. By contrast, full capacity broadband service carries millions of bits
per second, and is therefore better suited to higher volume applications. COUGAR
& McFADDEN, supra note 17, at 547; Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra
note 8, at 336. A "bit" is a single data character, the smallest unit of information
that can be recognized by a computer. COUGAR & McFADDEN, supra note 17, at
77. It is a contraction of "binary digit," the system of zeroes and ones upon
which all computer languages are based. Id.
Narrowband teletext may be transmitted over the Vertical Blanking Interval(VBI) of broadcast television, infra note 34, cable television VBI, or Multipoint
Distribution Services (MDS), infra note 40. Low Power Television (LPTV), infra
note 37, Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS), infra note 38, and the FM radio subcarrier
frequency, infra note 43, are alternate narrowband options. Regulation of Electronic
Broadcasting, supra note 8, at 337; NEUSTADT, supra note 24, at 14.
34. The Vertical Blanking Interval (VBI) is the black bar that appears on the
television screen when the vertical hold is not functioning properly. The New Video
Marketplace, supra note 10, at 535 n.23. There are twenty-one lines in the VBI,
one of which is used to signal the end of a videoframe, and another, line 21, is
reserved by the FCC for closed-captioning services to the hearing impaired. Id.
The 1983 Teletext Order ensures the continued use of line 21 for closed captioning
service for a period of five years and authorizes teletext transmission on lines 14-
18 and line 20. Lines 10-13 will be gradually phased in for teletext use in the
future. 1983 Teletext Order, supra note 29, at 1328.
35. Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note 8, at 337; NEUSTADT, supra
note 24, at 12.
36. Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note 8, at 342 n.33. The relatively
high cost of a teletext decoder, which is approximately $300, has been cited as
one reason for the slow development of the medium. Unless the price for this
equipment is substantially lowered or decoders become integrated into standard
television receivers, the market success of the medium is questionable. BROADCASTING,
Dec. 10, 1984, at 66; id., Mar. 11, 1985, at 105. Teletext decoders are regulated
under Part 15, subparts H & J, of the FCC Rules. 1983 Teletext Order, supra
note 29, at 1330.
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Low power television37 and direct broadcast satellites (DBS) 8 even-
tually also may be used to transmit teletext. a9 Microwave multipoint
distribution service (MDS)4° and cable can carry teletext over the
37. Low Power Television (LPTV), formally authorized by the FCC in April,
1982, 51 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 476 (1982), utilizes vacant UHF and VHF channels
to transmit local broadcasting, or rebroadcast network signals, over limited areas
at power levels significantly lower than full service television channels. 47 C.F.R.
§ 74.731 (1984). A typical LPTV system would operate at power levels of only
10 to 1,000 watts. 47 C.F.R. § 74.735(a) (1984). See In re Inquiry into the Future
Role of Low Power Television Broadcasting and Television Translators in the
National Telecommunications System, 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1267 (1983).
Although the technology for LPTV has existed since the 1950's and low power
transmitters, or translators, were authorized in 1956, 13 RAD. REG. (P & F) 1561,
the FCC only began to formally examine the potential of the medium in 1980. 45
Fed. Reg. 69,178 (1980). During the pendency of this rulemaking, the Commission
was forced to issue a freeze on license applications, as thousands of broadcasters
sought to cash in on the anticipated goldmine. In September, 1983, the FCC in-
stituted a lottery system to select from amongst the competing applicants and began
granting LPTV licenses. BROADCASTING, Dec. 10, 1984, at 58; 46 Fed. Reg. 26,062
(1981). In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection from
Among Certain Competing Applications Using Random Selection or Lotteries Instead
of Comparative Hearings, 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1401 (1983). Currently, there
are 266 licensed LPTV broadcasters and the FCC has issued construction permits
for 263 more. BROADCASTING, Oct. 1, 1984, at 81. LPTV stations have few regulatory
obligations. They must observe statutory prohibitions against broadcasting obscenities
and lotteries, and they must fulfill limited "fairness doctrine" and "equal time"
responsibilities. See infra note 196. There are no crosspartnership or multiple
ownership restrictions. BROADCASTING, Oct. 1, 1984, at 81; see The New Video
Marketplace, supra note 10, at 565 (subscribership predictions).
38. Direct Broadcasting Satellites (DBS) are radio communication services in
which signals from the earth are transmitted by highpower, geostationery satellites
for direct reception by small, relatively inexpensive earth terminals. Houdek, Video
Technology and the Law: A Bibliography of Legal and Law-Related Materials on
Cable Television, Subscription/Pay Television, Direct Broadcasting Satellites, Vi-
deorecording and Videotext, 5 COMM/ENT 341, 389 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Houdek]. Authorized by the FCC in 1982, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, DBS subscribership
is projected at 5.4 million households by 1990, The New Video Marketplace, supra
note 10, at 565 n.202, although only eight companies are presently authorized to
build DBS satellites. MtrLTICHANNEL NEWS, Feb. 18, 1985, at 35. Two of these are
in serious financial difficulty. BROADCASTING, April 1, 1985, at 35; see BROADCASTING,
Dec. 10, 1984, at 54-64. The FCC has recently proposed technical standards for DBS
facilities in order to ensure a reasonable degree of system interoperability and to
limit DBS system interference. MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Feb. 18, 1985, at 35.
39. Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note 8, at 336-37.
40. Multipoint Distribution Services (MDS) are over-the-air common carriers in
which omnidirectional microwave signals are used to transmit pay television and
data services to subscribers within the direct line of sight of the MDS transmitter.
Houdek, supra note 38, at 390; Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note
8, at 336 n.17.
Programming is generally supplied by content producers, such as Home Box
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VBI or as "broadband ' 41 full channel services 2.4  Alternatively, tele-
text may be transmitted on the subcarrier portion43 of the radio
frequency with virtually no discernable effect on the regular signal."4
Regardless of the medium of transmission, however, teletext is a
limited capacity service because it can provide only a finite number
of information pages on its scroll-like data cycle, 4' and because it
Office and Showtime, who lease transmission time from the MDS, solicit customers
and provide distribution services. The scrambled MDS signal is generally transmitted
on a full channel or VBI frequency to subscribers who must utilize a special decoder
attached to their television sets to unscramble the signal. As a common carrier,
the MDS operator must supply services consistent with FCC regulations, and its
rates are set pursuant to tariff. 47 C.F.R. § 21.903(b) (1984).
Although originally contemplated as a public service medium, MDS is emerging
as an entertainment facility which, if able to compete successfully with cable
television, may provide a valuable broadcasting alternative in dense urban areas.
BROADCASTING, Dec. 10, 1984, at 46; The New Video Marketplace, supra note 10,
at 546.
41. Broadband service is full capacity data transmission in which data is trans-
mitted at very high rates. The New Video Marketplace, supra note 10, at 535. See
supra note 33 for a comparison of broadband transmission with narrowband
transmission.
42. NEUSTADT, supra note 24, at 14. Broadband teletext may be transmitted as
a full television channel via cable or MDS technology, as well as low power television
or DBS. See supra notes 37-44 for discussions of these technologies. Each medium of
transmission offers different capabilities and is presently subject to different technical
and regulatory considerations. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
43. The FM subcarrier frequency is that portion of the radio frequency adjacent
to the frequency of the main channel. By use of complex multiplexing techniques,
which permit two or more independent signals to be transmitted simultaneously on
the same channel, the radio broadcaster can transmit several audio or data services
over its assigned frequency. See The New Video Marketplace, supra note 10, at 561.
Subscribers receive and separate the individual signals with special receivers. Id.;
see also MARTIN, supra note 27, at 34; PIERCE, supra note 27, at 71-88.
In May, 1983, the FCC eliminated all prior restrictions on the use of the
subcarrier frequencies. In re Amendment of Parts 2 and 73 of the Commission's
Rules Concerning Use of Subsidiary Communications Authorizations, 53 RAD. REG.
2d (P & F) 1519, 1534 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Subsidiary Comm. Auth.].
Previously permitted to use the subcarrier frequency only for broadcast purposes,
the new rules permit radio broadcasters to provide two or more audio or data
services on their channel frequencies. Id. at 1533. Data transmissions, local paging
and electronic mail are expected to be major consequences of the FCC's deregulation.
In April, 1984, the FCC reaffirmed its FM subsidiary communications position and
expanded it to preempt state regulation of the field. See In re Petition for Re-
consideration of Amendment of Parts 2 and 73 of the Commission's Rules Con-
cerning Use of Subsidiary Communications Authorization, 55 RAD. REG. 2d (P &
F) 1607 (1984). The FCC specifically noted that its decision was based on a policy
of fostering teletext-type communications over the subcarrier frequencies which were
being impeded by some state regulations. Id. at 1610 n.6.
44. NEUSTADT, supra note 24, at 12.
45. Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note 8, at 336-37; NEUSTADT,
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can convey only one-way "downstream" information, from the central
computer to the subscriber."6 Due to the limitations of the appli-
cable technology, teletext cannot provide individualized information
services .4  Rather, it is constrained to offer only general purpose
information designed for public use.48 In the United States, a common
example of teletext is closed captioning, in which one line of the
television VB149 is used to display program captions to the hearing
impaired. 0 The subscriber accesses the caption by means of a decoder"
attached to a television set. In Great Britain, where teletext was
pioneered in the mid-1970's 2 continuously updated weather reports
and financial and sports information are provided to subscribers,
along with an "alarm clock" page over which emergency information
can be displayed. 3
B. Videotext Technology
Two-way videotext offers the subscriber a much broader range of
information services than those provided through teletext. Videotext
information is stored in computer data bases54 which users access
through a menu or a key word search.5 By using the sophisticated
supra note 24, at 10-14. For a comparison of teletext and videotext technology,
see infra note 54.
46. Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note 8, at 332-33. Downstream
transmission is the provision of data from the central computer to the user's
terminal. NEtJSTADT, supra note 24, at 14. It is to be contrasted to the upstream
capacity in which the user has the ability to send messages back to the computer
from the remote terminal. Id. See infra note 57 for a discussion of the upstream
capabilities of videotext technology.
47. Global View, supra note 24, at 119-20.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 34.
50. Global View, supra note 24, at 120.
51. See supra note 36.
52. NEUSTADT, supra note 24, at 22.
53. Global View, supra note 24, at 120. Britain currently has two teletext
services: "CEEFAX" (for "See the Facts"), developed by the BBC and supported
by an annual fee collected from all British television set owners, and "ORACLE"
(Optical Reception of Announcements by Coded Line Electronics), an advertiser-
supported system which is distributed by the Independent Broadcasting Authority.
Id. at 119-20; NEUSTADT, supra note 24, at 19.
54. A data base is any data or information which is computed, classified,
transmitted, received, processed, switched, stored, recorded or used by a computer
or computer system. See COUGAR & MCFADDEN, supra note 17, at 539. Because
there is no technical limitation to the amount of information which can be contained
in these data bases, videotext can provide subscribers with more extensive services
than can the more limited medium of the teletext "scroll." NEUSTADT, supra note
24, at 13; see also Global View, supra note 24, at 121.
55. LEXIS is a familiar legal example of on-line videotext.
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"switching ' 5 6 technology of two-way telephone wires or cable, vi-
deotext can transmit information "upstream" from the user back
to the central computer as well as "downstream," and can route
different data to numerous subscribers simultaneously.17 It can also
function as a "gateway, '""R connecting subscribers to various inde-
pendent data bases.5 9 When these data bases are operated by other
subscribers or information providers, 60 the user has access to elec-
tronic mail, 6' electronic bulletin boards62 and videogames. 61 Data
56. "Switching" is the ability of a system to route different messages to various
subscribers simultaneously. NEUSTADT, supra note 24, at 13; see also PIERCE, supra
note 27, at 129-49 (explaining switching technology).
57. NEUSTADT, supra note 24, at 14. Currently, American videotext systems
rely on telephone wires to send information "downstream" from the host computer
to the user and then "upstream" from the user back to the central computer. The
New Video Marketplace, supra note 10, at 556. Cable technology, however, has
a much greater capacity to handle information than does the telephone's copper
wires, and experiments are under way to develop cable videotext in which cables
will be utilized to provide both upstream and downstream information flow. NEUS-
TADT, supra note 24, at 14. Because current cable technology, however, has not
fully developed the switching capacity of telephone networks, see supra note 56,
it is expected that the most likely cable videotext service will be a "hybrid" in
which the downstream signal would be transmitted by cable and the user's upstream
reply would be sent via the telephone network. Id. Such a system would take
advantage of the technical capacities of cable while minimizing the subscriber's
costs in an age of increasingly inflated telephone rates. Id. at 13-14.
58. See Global View, supra note 24, at 126; Regulation of Electronic Publishing,
supra note 8, at 334. This "gateway" capacity of the videotext medium provides
subscribers with tremendous informational opportunities. British users of Inde-
pendent Information Providers' "Gateway" service, instituted in 1982, interface
with outside systems to book airline reservations, access bank accounts and make
on-line purchases from computerized retailers. Global View, supra note 24, at 122.
The French TELETEL system contains a limited amount of information pages
within its own data bases but, through its "distributed gateway architecture,"
enables its subscribers to access third party data bases within France, as well as
more than twenty other host computers, through switched network or leased line
technology. Id. at 126. Users may also access foreign data bases on the continent
or the United States via an international gateway which is controlled by TELETEL.
Id. The TELETEL interconnections are all made within a two-second response
time. Id.
59. Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note 8, at 334; NEUSTADT, supra
note 24, at 17.
60. Information providers include authors or print publishers who contribute
their material and who design the "electronic pages." NEUSTADT, supra note 24,
at 18.
61. See supra note 14.
62. See supra note 2.
63. Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note 8, at 334; Videotext Sym-
posium, supra note 10, at 152. See generally Global View, supra note 24, for a
discussion of the various international uses of videotext.
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bases available from service providers64 such as banks and retailers
create the transactional opportunities of home banking65 and home
shopping. 66
Videotext is currently available in the United States through on-
line information services such as CompuServe, The Source and Dow
Jones News/Retrieval, 67 as well as various experimental and more
limited efforts. 68 At this time, the medium is more widely available
64. See Videotext Symposium, supra note 10, at 152. See, e.g., Chemical Bank's
Pronto electronic banking system, discussed supra note 16. Database ownership
raises questions about copyright which are beyond the scope of this Article. For
discussions and examples of these issues, see generally Regulation of Electronic
Publishing, supra note 8, at 410-14; Note, Toward a Unified Theory of Copyright
Infringement for an Advanced Technological Era, 96 HARv. L. REV. 450 (1982);
Note, Allocating Copyright Liability to Telecommunications Common Carriers Supply-
ing Cable Systems, 67 MINN. L. REv. 963 (1983); WGN Continental Broadcasting Co.
v. United Video, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. 111. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 622 (7th
Cir. 1982) (teletext portion of television program encoded in VBI covered by
copyright of carrier although it infringed copyright of television station).
65. See supra note 16.
66. The New Video Marketplace, supra note 10, at 536; see infra note 68. See,
e.g., the "electronic mall" provided by CompuServe, discussed infra note 67, which
provides subscribers with access to 35 merchants. BROADCASTING, Jan. 14, 1985,
at 166.
67. Originally called "on-line data services," CompuServe, The Source and Dow
Jones News/Retrieval pioneered the videotext market in the mid-to late 1970's by
providing news and information services to owners of personal computers. BROAD-
CASTING, Jan. 14, 1985, at 162. CompuServe, the Columbus, Ohio-based subsidiary
of H&R Block, offers its 164,000 subscribers a primarily text-oriented service,
but provides the technology for graphics as well. Id. at 166. Combined, CompuServe,
The Source and Down Jones News/Retrieval reach approximately 400,000 subscribers,
Id. See also Berton, The Business Connection, POPULAR COMPUTING, Mar., 1985,
at 74-80 for a comprehensive review of currently available on-line information sources.
68. NEUSTADT, supra note 24, at 19-24. The first American entrant in the
videotext market was Viewdata Corporation of America, a subsidiary of Knight-
Ridder Newspapers Inc., which launched the nation's first commercial videotext
service in southern Florida in 1983. BROADCASTING, Dec. 10, 1984, at 66. Sub-
scribership at the end of the first year was less than 3,000, far short of corporate
projections. Id. The project holds 18,000 pages of information including news,
weather, sports, product ratings and lists of adult educational courses, and provides
transactional opportunities through participating department stores, grocery stores
and banks. NEUSTADT, supra note 24, at 19. The data are compiled by Knight-
Ridder, relying upon such information sources as the American Library Association,
and the publishers of Consumer Reports, the New York Times and the Congressional
Quarterly. Sigel, Videotex: Into the Cruel World, DATAMATION, Sept. 15, 1984, at
133. Communications lines are furnished by Southern Bell, and the Sceptre videotext
terminals are manufactured by AT&T. Id. Market expansion is currently underway
although system modifications have been implemented to increase the commercial
viability of the videotext system. BROADCASTING, Jan. 21, 1985, at 7. Knight-Ridder
lost $16 million on VIEWTRON in 1984. MULTICHANNEL NEws, Feb. 11, 1985, at 49.
Other current videotext projects include AP News Plus, the Associated Press'
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in Europe, Britain, 69 Canada and Japan.70
As the home computer revolution gains strength in the United
States,7" however, and international ventures prove to be financially
attractive, American corporations are expected to enter the videotext
marketplace in greater numbers.12 The most likely participants will
be consortia 73 of data processing, publishing and financial companies,
graphics-enhanced service which made its debut in Maryland in January, 1985,
BROADCASTING, Jan. 28, 1985, at 11, and "Gateway," a telephone-based consumer
videotext service which was developed by Times Mirror Videotext Services in
association with Toronto's Infomart and AT&T Consumer Information Services.
Id., Oct. 8, 1984, at 100. Gateway is being sold to Los Angeles area subscribers
as " 'an interactive information and transactional communication service' " which
will allow them to buy products and services, pay bills, send and receive electronic
mail, play video games and gain access to national data bases. Id. The service
costs $99 for the start-up fee, plus $29.95 per month. Id.
TRINTREX, a joint venture videotext service of IBM, CBS and Sears, is expected
to premier nationwide in 1986. The primary service to be offered by TRINTREX,
however, will be home shopping rather than news or home banking. DATAMATION,
Sept. 15, 1984, at 140. TRINTREX required a first year investment of $130 million,
in contrast to the $34 million invested in Knight-Ridder's VIEWTRON, and the
$15 million expended on the Times-Mirror venture. Id. TRINTREX is expected to
solve one of the major market problems of the videotext industry by permitting
its subscribers to access the system via any compatible microcomputer. Id. Knight-
Ridder and Times-Mirror subscribers must utilize AT&T's Sceptre videotext terminal
which, although cordless and lightweight, has no computing capacity, cannot run
packaged software and has a small, hard to use keyboard. Id.
69. In Britain, the Post Office first offered interactive videotext, the PRESTEL
system, via phone lines, to its subscribers in 1979. NEUSTADT, supra note 24, at
22. PRESTEL offers gateways to independent information providers to whom it
leases transmission lines, thereby allowing users to access air, rail and ferry schedule
information. Global View, supra note 24, at 122. Users can also book passage on
public transportation and conduct on-line purchases from computerized stores. Id.
In October, 1981, an electronic mail service was instituted which offered message
services throughout the entire PRESTEL network as well as within closed user
groups such as corporate subscribers. Id. at 123.
70. See Global View, supra note 24, at 122-33 (extensive review of foreign
videotext market); see also MacDonald & Marisi, Videotex Thrives in the Country,
TELEPHONY, Nov. 5, 1984, at 28-34 (technical examination of operations of one re-
cent Canadian videotext venture).
71. See generally Robins, Computer Communications: Industry Interdependence,
1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 471; Computers in Law and Society, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 371.
72. See, e.g., joint venture videotext plan of AT&T, Chemical Bank, Time,
Inc., and Bank of America, which was announced on February 4, 1985, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 5, 1985, at Dl, col. 3, and the consortium of the Public Broadcasting
Service, IBM and Merrill Lynch, which was announced on February 20, 1985,
following FCC authorization of PBS market entry. 57 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 842
(1985); N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at A2, col. 5; BROADCASTING, Mar. 4, 1985,
at 88; TELEPHONY, Mar. 18, 1985, at 20. See infra note 336.
73. N.Y. City Bus., Feb. 25, 1985, at I. Currently, three giant consortia are
vying for the American videotext market: (I) R.C.A., Citicorp and J.C. Penney;
(2) IBM, Sears, Roebuck and CBS, Inc.; and (3) AT&T, Chemical Bank and Time,
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whose distinct areas of expertise may profitably converge 4 in elec-
tronic publishing.
III. Historical Perspective on the New Media
There are various reasons why the United States, a pioneer in the
data processing field, has been outdistanced by foreign venturers in
the videotext and teletext markets. The most significant reason is
the historic division between the American data processing and
communications industries. The current digital75 electronics revolution
increasingly highlights the folly of this distinction. 76
Media which were separated by both technology of operation and
use for much of this century now are converging in their reliance
on digital electronics. 77 The reason is clear. Electronic transmission
via digital pulses is a cleaner, faster, easier method of conveying
Inc. Id. The joint-venturing is desirable because it would spread the risk of entering
the expensive new industry, as well as provide complementary expertise. Thus, each
team includes a hardware producer, an information provider and a financial services
company. Id. at 22. Similarly, Knight-Ridder's VIEWTRON system, discussed supra
note 68, combines the corporate expertise of Knight-Ridder, Southern Bell, AT&T
and numerous independent information providers and publishers. DATAMATION, Sept.
15, 1984, at 133. In 1983, CBS, Inc. and AT&T united to conduct a joint videotext
experiment in Ridgewood, New Jersey. Global View, supra note 24, at 137. Centel,
Honeywell and the Chicago Sun Times have also combined forces to provide a
new Chicago area consumer videotext service. BROADCASTING, Oct. 8, 1984, at 100.
Teletext joint ventures are also seen as a valuable tool in marketing and promoting
the digital information media. Id., Feb. 4, 1985, at 85. Taft Broadcasting and
Satellite Syndicated systems have recently joined to promote Electra, a teletext
magazine which will be distributed to broadcasters and cable operators free of
charge in order to " 'stimulate the market (and] to get decoders in the marketplace.' "
Id. See supra note 36 for a discussion of economic difficulties in teletext decoder
sales.
74. While American consumers have yet to evidence any significant interest in
the potential of electronic publishing, industry adventurers continue to support their
faith in the potential of videotext and teletext by expanding their investments in
these media. BROADCASTING, Dec. 10, 1984, at 66, 70. Despite the slow growth of
teletext and videotext services currently on the market, CBS and Knight-Ridder,
two electronic publishing venturers, retain a strong commitment to an industry that
is " 'going to happen.' " Id. at 70.
75. See supra note 17.
76. In Computer 1, 18 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 1719, the FCC noted that
the great operating speed of computers had blurred the historic distinctions between
digital telegraph and analog telephone technologies. Modern communication net-
works combine the mechanisms and attributes of both. Accord United States v.
Western Electric Co., 50 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 145, 149-51 (1981).
77. United States v. Western Electric Co., 50 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 145, 149-51
(1981). See generally M. IRWIN, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA (1984) [hereinafter
cited as TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA]; 1. DE SOLO POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF
FREEDOM (1983) [hereinafter cited as TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM].
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information than any previously utilized technology. 8 It is equally
well suited to text or graphics, voice or data, entertainment or
informational transmission. 79 Thus, industries which previously were
separate and distinct now find themselves merging into a single
electronic community. 80
The development of remote computer terminal capabilities, 8 time
sharing networks8 2 and microprocessor technology83 have extended
this community into our homes as well as our offices. The Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission) was acutely
aware of these developments in 1980 when it noted that the phe-
nomenon of distributed processing allows computers and terminals
to perform both data processing and communications control ap-
plications within the network at the customer's premises. 4 The FCC
went on to acknowledge that, "dramatic advances in large-scale
integrated circuitry and microprocessor technology have perm~itted
fabrication of mini-computers, micro-computers, and other special
purpose devices, which are capable of duplicating many of the
datamanipulative capabilities which were previously available only
at centralized locations housing large scale general-purpose com-
puters." 85 These developments have obviated many of the technical im-
pediments to a nationwide electronic publishing marketplace. 6 All
78. TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM, supra note 77, at 27.
79. Computer II, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 669, 693 (1980) ("[m]ore and more
the thrust is for carriers to . . . accommodate a subscriber's communications needs,
regardless of whether subscribers use it for voice, data, video, facsimile, or other
forms of transmission").
80. "IT]he computer industry and the communications industry are becoming
more and more interwoven .... [Tihis trend will become even more pronounced
in the future." Computer II, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 695.
81. Remote access capability is the ability of a computer system to transmit
data between the central computer and a separate, usually off-site terminal. Computer
I, 18 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 1719-20; see IBM v. FCC, 570 F.2d 452 (2d Cir.
1978), discussed infra note 110.
82. Timesharing permits several remote users of a computer system to gain
concurrent access to the central computer. It offers a subscriber significant economic
advantages in that there is no need to purchase or lease a complete individual
system. Computer I, 18 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 1721; COUGAR & MCFADDEN,
supra note 17, at 553.
83. Microprocessors are relatively small but powerful computers which are mounted
on a single semiconductor chip or printed circuit board. COUGAR & MCFADDEN,
supra note 17, at 546. Their low cost has created the widespread business computer
market.
84. Computer II, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 674.
85. Id.
86. TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM, supra note 77, at 6-10; see supra notes 73-85
and accompanying text.
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that remains is the coordination of resources by market entrants
who must overcome their traditionally competitive and segregated
pursuits.
A. Historical Antecedents to Media Regulation
The distinct identities of the data processing and communications
industries have not been altogether self-imposed. While market eco-
nomics were a significant factor in segregating the developing media
during the first half of this century,87 government regulation clearly
paralleled and institutionalized that breach. 88
The regulatory watchdog for most of this evolution has been the
FCC, which was authorized by the Communications Act of 1934
(Communications Act or the Act)89 to regulate interstate commerce
by wire and radio. 9° The Communications Act was based on the
Radio Act of 192791 and on the legislative conviction that government
regulation of the new media was necessary to "preclude bedlam on
87. While each communication medium now occupies a separate and distinct
niche, the relative positioning was not always so clear. Technically, there is nothing
inherent in the telephone which uniquely suits it to individualized communications.
See TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM, supra note 77, at 27. In fact, during the early
part of the century in Budapest, Hungary, telephones were used to transmit music
rather than person-to-person conversations. Id. Similarly, until the 1970's, the Soviet
Union utilized wired public address systems, rather than radio frequencies, to
disseminate mass communications. Id. at 32.
88. See infra notes 89-106 and accompanying text.
89. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934).
90. "For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communica-
tion by wire and radio so as to make available .... a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and
world-wide wire and radio communication service .. there is created a commission
to be known as the 'Federal Communications Commission.' " 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934).
91. Id. §§ 81-119 (repealed June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1102)
(current law at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982)). In 1926, a bill to regulate radio
communications was introduced in the House of Representatives. H.R. 9971, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess., 67 CONG. REC. 4956 (1926) (introduced by Rep. White). Enormous
increases in the use of the radio spectrum had made the existing, federal statutes
inadequate. See 67 CONG. REC. 5478-79 (1926) (statement of Rep. White). The bill
was passed by Congress in 1927, 68 CONG. REC. 2580, 4155 (1927), and was enacted
as the Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 81-119 (repealed) (current version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982)). The Act
abolished the Radio Division of the Department of Commerce (which had jurisdiction
over foreign and interstate radio communications) and transferred its powers, duties,
personnel and fiscal appropriations to the Federal Radio Commission. The power
of the Commission to regulate the communications industry, by limiting the number
of licenses awarded to radio stations, was eventually taken over by the Federal
Communications Commission. 44 Stat. 1162-63, §§ 3-4, at 1166-67, §§ 9-11; S. 3285,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 5957, 8822 (1934).
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broadcast frequencies." ' 92 It provided for three distinct regulatory
schemes for broadcasters, 93 common carriers94 and non-broadcast
users of the radio spectrum, 95 such as citizens band and mobile
radios. By separating the regulated broadcast media in Title III from
the common carriers96 in Title II, and all radio and wire commu-
nications from the unregulated print media, 97 the Communications
Act perpetrated a division which essentially precluded the evolution
of a cooperative communications industry.
92. Midwest Video I, 571 F.2d 1025, 1036 (8th Cir. 1978).
93. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-332 (1982); 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1-73.597 (1984).
94. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1982); 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.0-21.512 (1984).
95. 47 U.S.C. §§ 351-362 (1982); 47 C.F.R. §§ 83.1-83.74 (1984).
96. The Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982)) defines a common carrier as "any person
engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by
wire or radio .... ." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1982). No person engaged in broadcasting
shall be deemed a common carrier. 78 CONG. REC. 10,969 (1934); see also FCC
v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 704 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Midwest
Video III (Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610, unequivocally prohibits
FCC from treating broadcasters as common carriers).
Originally, any business which held itself out as providing a service to the general
public was brought under the umbrella of these common carrier regulations. National
Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-42 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Common carrier regulation has been imposed on local telephone and telegraph
services, United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 349 (1959) (citing FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474); postal services, United States v. Van
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251-52 (1970); railways, Hannibal Railroad v. Swift, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 262 (1870). The Supreme Court has defined a common carrier in
the communications field as one that "makes a public offering to provide [com-
munications facilities] whereby all members of the public who choose to employ
such facilities may communicate or transmit intelligence of their own design and
choosing ...... Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 701, (citing Report and Order,
Industrial Radiolocation Service, 5 F.C.C.2d 197, 202 (1966)). "[A] common carrier
does not make individualized decisions in particular cases, whether and on what terms
to deal." Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 701, (citing National Ass'n of Regulatory
Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976)).
97. Incidental business regulation of the press is permissible. Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945). However, the content regulations and access
requirements of the Communications Act, while applicable to broadcasters and
common carriers, are not applicable to the print media. See infra notes 135-46
and accompanying text.
While not absolute, the first amendment consistently has been held to limit
governmental interference with the journalistic pursuits of reporters and the editorial
functions of the printed press. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 258 (1974).
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made
as to the limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment
of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute
the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be dem-
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In 1970, the FCC reinforced this segregation in its First Computer
Inquiry (Computer 1)98 by distinguishing computer technology from
common carrier communications services and assuming jurisdiction
over only the latter. 99 The FCC adopted a policy of "maximum
separation"' ° between the data processing and communications in-
onstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be
exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as
they have evolved to this time.
Id. at 258; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1954).
See generally F. SIEBERT, THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE PRESS 1-11 (1970)
(historical discussion of the first amendment); Anderson, The Origins of the Press
Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983) (evolution of first amendment press liberties).
98. In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence
of Computer and Communications Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 18
RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1713 (1970) (Tentative Decision); 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 21 RAD.
REG. 2d (P & F) 1591 (1971) (Final Decision), aff'd in part sub nom. GTE Serv.
Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 26 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 901 (2d Cir. 1973),
remanded, 40 F.C.C.2d 293, 26 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1727 (1973).
The FCC initiated its inquiry in 1966 "to provide a public forum for the
examination, discussion and resolution of a number of regulatory and policy
questions that appeared to be emerging from the growing interdependence of
computers and communications services and facilities." Computer I, 18 RAD. REG.
2d (P & F), at 1718.
The FCC addressed itself to the development of information regarding actual
and potential computer uses of communication facilities and services. Id. at 1714.
It sought to gather information and develop recommendations as to: (1) whether
there was any need for new or improved common carrier services, regulations,
practices, or rate revisions to meet the emerging communications needs for the
processing of data; (2) whether, and under what circumstances, data processing
and other computer services involving the use of communications facilities should
be free from, or subject to, government regulation; (3) whether, and under what
conditions, the entry into the data processing field by common carriers and others
requires regulatory control; and (4) whether any privacy protection measures should
be required of the computer industry, communications common carriers, or the
government with respect to data stored in computers and transmitted over com-
munications facilities. Id. See generally Frieden, The Computer Inquiries: Mapping
the Communications/Information Processing Terrain, 33 FED. COM. L.J. 55 (1981)
(analysis of FCC regulatory scheme in communications industries) [hereinafter cited
as The Computer Inquiries].
99. Computer 1, 18 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 1722. The FCC determined that
there was "no need to assert regulatory authority over data processing services,
whether or not such services employ communications facilities in order to link the
terminals of subscribers to centralized computers." Id. The FCC relied on the
effectiveness of competition in the data processing industry to justify its abdication
from regulatory control. Id. However, citing its broad grant of powers under the
Communications Act to regulate common carriers, the FCC ruled that it had "ample
jurisdiction" to regulate the provision of data processing services by carriers. Id.
at 1724. The corresponding regulations are contained in 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.702(b)-
64.702(c) (1984).
100. Computer 1, 18 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 1726. "We believe that these objectives
[of ensuring the provision of economic and efficient common carrier services, the
ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING
dustries, whereby regulated common carriers could offer only un-
regulated data processing services through separate corporate entities. 01
The most viable market entrant, however, American Telephone and
Telegraph Company (AT&T), was precluded by the terms of its 1956
Consent Decree 10 2 from entering the unregulated data processing
field. ,03
This media segregation was paralleled in the developing cable
industry as a result of a 1966 FCC decision which brought that
medium under the umbrella of section 214 of the Communications
Act.'0 4 The FCC ruled that any common carrier engaged in cable
construction had to demonstrate satisfactorily how public interest,
convenience and necessity would be served by a proposed system.0 5
The regulatory burdens of this decision effectively preempted any
prevention of improper subsidization, and continued uninhibited free and fair
competition] will be best achieved by a maximum separation of activities which
are subject to regulation from non-regulated activities involving data processing."
Id.; see also The Computer Inquiries, supra note 98, at 67-72.
101. Computer I, 18 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 1726. "Communications common
carriers shall furnish data processing services only through separate corporate entities."
See id. at 36 for the specific requirements regarding this separation. See also
GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 730 n.7 (2d Cir. 1973) (common carriers
whose operating revenues did not exceed $1 million are exempted from these rules).
102. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246, 13
RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 2143 (1956) (affirming consent decree between AT&T and
Justice Department). This case, initiated in 1949 when the Justice Department sued
AT&T and its manufacturing subsidiary, Western Electric, alleging various antitrust
violations, ended in 1956 with severe restrictions placed on AT&T's entry into the
unregulated noncommunications market. Id. at 71,137-138; see also The Computer
Inquiries, supra note 98, at 105-07 (interpretation of 1956 consent decree).
103. Computer I, 18 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 1722. Where, however, data process-
ing services were incidental to communications activities, permitted to AT&T and
the related Bell System companies under the consent decree, AT&T and its affiliated
Operating Companies were allowed to furnish such services. Id. at 1729.
104. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1982).
(a) No carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line or of an
extension of any line, or shall acquire or operate any line, or extension
thereof, or shall engage in transmission over or by means of such
additional or extended line, unless and until there shall first have been
obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future
public convenience and necessity require or will require the construction,
or operation, or construction and operation, of such additional or ex-
tended line: Provided, That no such certificate shall be required under
this section for the construction, acquisition, or operation of (1) a line
within a single State unless such line constitutes part of an interstate
line, (2) local, branch, or terminal lines not exceeding ten miles in length,
or (3) any line acquired under section 221 or 222 of this title ....
Id.
105. In re Associated Bell Sys. Cos. Tariffs for Channel Serv. for Use by Com-
munity Antenna Television Sys., 5 F.C.C.2d 357 (1966), (sustaining FCC's deter-
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interplay between the cable industry and common carriers for most
of the critical early evolution of the cable medium. 1°6
B. The Developing Regulatory and Technological Climate
Recent administrative developments have significantly eroded many
of these market impediments. 10 7 In 1976, the FCC commenced its
Second Computer Inquiry (Computer II)108 to redefine its authority
over the rapidly changing communications industry.1°9 The Com-
mission discarded the unworkable dichotomy of Computer 11° and
substituted an analytic framework based on the distinction between
mination to bring cable operations under umbrella of section 214 of Communica-
tions Act), aff'd sub nom. General Tel. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
106. M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE: LEGAL AND BUSINESS ASPECTS OF CABLE
AND PAY TELEVISION (1981) [hereinafter cited as ALL ABOUT CABLE].
107. See generally The New Video Marketplace, supra note 10, at 566-602 (blur-
ring of regulatory distinctions between communications services).
108. Computer H, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 669.
109. Computer II, id., provided a broad examination of the problems spawned
by the confluence of computer and communications technologies, based on the
then existing state of the art. By 1976 the FCC began to acknowledge the significant
advancements in hardware and software which had been made since Computer I;
supra note 26; see In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry) (Notice of Proposed Rule-making), 61
F.C.C.2d 103, 105 (1976); In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's
Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry) (Supplemental Notice of Inquiry
and Enlargement of Proposed Rulemaking), 64 F.C.C.2d 771, 771 (1977); In re
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry) (Tentative Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry and Rule-
making), 72 F.C.C.2d 358, 363 (1979). In Computer H, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P &
F), at 674, the FCC acknowledged that the dramatic advances in computer technology
since Computer I required a reexamination of the definitional structure used to
distinguish regulated communications services from unregulated data processing
services. But see Patrick, FCC Commissioner Questions Application of Computer
II Concepts, TELEPHONY, Feb. 18, 1985, at 46 (FCC Commissioner Dennis Patrick
questions the continued application of Computer II concepts).
110. Computer 11, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 674-75. A key factor in the
FCC's acknowledgement of the infeasibility of the data processing/communications
distinction was its own decision in In re AT&T, 62 F.C.C.2d 21 (1977), aff'd sub
nom. IBM Corp. v. FCC, 570 F.2d 452, 42 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 366 (2d Cir.
1978) [hereinafter cited as Dataspeed], in which remote computer capabilities, defined
supra note 81, were first confronted by the FCC. The computer regulations embodied
in 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 did not address the situation where data processing elements
were removed from the central computer and distributed among various components
within the particular service offering. Thus, the FCC rules left unregulated the
provision of computer terminals by common carriers. The Dataspeed decision
permitted AT&T to offer computer terminals as part of its communications services
subject to tariff. 62 F.C.C.2d at 30-32. The FCC was dissatisfied with the Dataspeed
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"basic" and "enhanced" transmission services."' The revised ap-
proach was intended to reflect the impossibility of attempting to
distinguish between communications and data processing in an en-
vironment which seemed to require overlapping definitions.
Under Computer II, basic services, or the transmission of pure,
"transparent" information by a common carrier, continues to be
regulated under Title 11.112 Enhanced services, which are any trans-
missions beyond basic service, including all data processing activities,
are unregulated." 3 Reversing the major market constraint created by
decision as it reflected on the definitional constraints of Computer I. This prompted
the FCC to revise the scope of its Computer II inquiry. See Computer II, supra
note 17, at 675.
Following a review of the comments on the Notice and Supplemental Notice,
45 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1485, at 8-58 (1979) (Tentative Decision), the FCC
determined that any purely definitional approach that sought to set forth a concrete
distinction between data processing and communications would be "a short term
solution and would fail to recognize and take advantage of the potential for new
and innovative competitive computer services." Computer II, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P
& F), at 676. The FCC noted that while computer technology was increasingly remov-
ing technical limitations as to the types of enhanced services that could be offered
by regulated carriers, the existing regulatory scheme relied on this artificial distinc-
tion between communications and data processing services. Id. at 675.
111. Computer I1, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 695. The adoption of a
differentiation between basic and enhanced services best promotes the public interest
because it comports with the actual development of this dynamic industry. Id. at
100; see also TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, supra note 77, at 45-46 (distinction drawn
between 'basic' and 'enhanced' communications services rather than attempt to define
difference between communications and computing).
112. Computer 1I, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 693. Basic service is the offering
of "a pure transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually
transparent in terms of its interaction with customer supplied information." In re
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry) (Final Decision), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 420, [hereinafter cited as
Amend. of Section 64.702], reconsidered, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Final Decision Reconsidered], further reconsidered, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981),
aff'd sub nom. Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198
(D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2109 (1983).
113. Computer 11, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 669. Enhanced service "combines
basic service with computer processing applications that act on the format, content,
code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information, or
provide the subscriber additional, different or restructured information, or involve
subscriber interaction with stored information." Amend. of Section 64.702, 77
F.C.C.2d at 387; see also 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 (1984).
In separating basic from enhanced services, the FCC clearly set forth the policy
considerations behind the new approach.
We believe that our adoption of a differentiation between basic and
enhanced services best furthers the public interest because it comports
with the actual development of this dynamic industry. As the market
applications of computer technology increase, communications capacity
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Computer I, the FCC in Computer II held that common carriers, 14
other than AT&T need not form separate corporate entities for the
provision of enhanced services." 5 The fears about monopolization
upon which the Computer I requirement was grounded were viewed
as unwarranted in an increasingly competitive marketplace.
has become the necessary link allowing the technology to function more
efficiently and more productively .... [T]he computer industry and the
communications industry are becoming more and more interwoven [and]
... this trend will become even more pronounced in the future ....
Thus, the pressure on a set of adminstrative rules which fail to recognize
the growth in operational sophistication demanded by our nation's econ-
omy will be inexorable.
Computer I, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 695-96.
The FCC thus set forth guidelines which would: (1) leave undisturbed the
provision of basic service; (2) allow the provider of basic services to "integrate
technological advances conducive to the more efficient transmission of information
through the network without the threat of a sudden, fundamental change in the
regulatory treatment of that service or firm;" (3) draw a clear and "sustainable
line between basic and enhanced services upon which business entities can rely in
making investment and marketing decisions;" and (4) remove the "threat of reg-
ulation from markets which were unheard of in 1934 and bear none of the important
characteristics justifying the imposition of economic regulation by an administrative
agency." Id. at 696. The FCC specifically noted that the provision of "teletext and
viewdata type services to residential consumers" was a prime example of new markets
and services which are being opened up by the new communications and data pro-
cessing technologies. Id. at 699.
114. Computer H, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 731. Continued application of
a maximum separation policy to all carriers was held to be inappropriate in light
of the evolving telecommunications market. Id. Accordingly, separation was found
to be appropriate only "in those cases in which there is a substantial threat of
injury to the communications ratepayer and where other regulatory tools would
not suffice." Id.
115. The original decision required both GTE and AT&T to form separate
subsidiaries for the provision of enhanced services. Final Decision Reconsidered,
84 F.C.C.2d at 72. The FCC examined the monopoly status of both AT&T and
GTE, along with their integration with affiliated equipment manufacturers. The
Commission found that the public interest would be best served by restricting these
two communications giants as well as their corporate subsidiaries in order to prevent
their exploitation of their dominant market position. Computer II, 47 RAD. REG.
2d (P & F), at 731.
Under the Final Decision Reconsidered, 84 F.C.C.2d at 72, GTE was exempted
from this constraint. See also 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(c) (1984). "[Tlhe benefits of
maintaining the separate subsidiary requirements for carriers other than AT&T do
not outweigh other public considerations." In re Amendment of § 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry) (Memorandum
Opinion and Order On Further Reconsideration), 50 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 629,
646 (1981), citing 84 F.C.C.2d at 75. The FCC retained the separate subsidiary
requirement for AT&T and its affiliates until March 1, 1985. N.Y. Times, Mar.
2, 1985, at 33, col. 1. Finding that the competitive abuses to which separation
had been addressed no longer existed, see 50 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) at 648, 81
(1981), the FCC waived the requirement for all seven Bell Operating Companies.
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The ability of AT&T to enter the new markets was clarified further
by the 1982 Modified Final Judgment (MFJ)" 6 in the seven-year-
long AT&T antitrust litigation.117 This decision freed AT&T from
N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1985, at 33, col. 1. The FCC action permits these telephone
companies to offer low and medium speed data transmission to residential customers.
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Mar. 11, 1985, at 7. See FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S.
223 (1946); Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Pocket Phone Broadcast
Serv. v. FCC, 538 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1976), for examples of the FCC's obligation
to reexamine policies where circumstances change or where anticipated abuses fail
to materialize.
116. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
117. See generally In re The Consol. Application of Am. Telephone and Telegraph
Co. and Specified Bell Sys. Cos. for Authorization Under Section 214 and 310(d)
of the Communications Act of 1934 for Transfers of Interstate Lines, Assignments
of Radio Licenses, Transfers of Control of Corps. Holding Radio Licenses and Other
Transactions as Described in the Application, 55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 435 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as AT&T Divestiture]; W.B. TUNSTALL, DISCONNECTING PARTIES:
MANAGING THE BELL SYSTEM BREAKUP (1985); O'Reilly, Ma Bell's Kids Fight For
Position, FORTUNE, June 27, 1983, at 62-91; Taylor, The Bell Breakup, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Oct. 24, 1983, at 51-55; Wiley, The Basics of the AT&T Consent
Decree, 1 CoM. LAW. 3 (Winter 1983).
On November 20, 1974, the United States Department of Justice filed suit in
the United State District Court for the District of Columbia against AT&T, Western
Electric and Bell Labs, alleging various violations of the antitrust laws, including
that AT&T monopolized the intercity telecommunications market and the tele-
communications product market in violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§
1-7) by using its control over the BOC's to preclude competition in both of these
markets, United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 135-36 (1983), aff'd, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983). The government sought the divestiture from AT&T of the BOC's and
Western Electric. Id. at 139. BOC's are defined as only the wholly owned operating
companies of AT&T. Id. at 139 n.19. Cincinatti Bell and Southern New England
Bell are not included.
The parties reached an accord in January, 1982, in a consent decree which
completely restructured the Bell System. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 140-41. Section
I of the Decree provided that "AT&T would be required to endow the [Operating]
Companies with sufficient personnel, facilities, systems, and rights to technical
information to enable them to provide exchange telecommunications and exchange
access services." Id. at 142.
Section II of the Decree specifies certain requirements for the divested Operating
Companies, including the requirement that each Operating Company provide to all
interexchange carriers exchange access that is "equal in type, quality and price to
the services provided to AT&T and its affiliates." Id. Conduct by the Operating
Companies is also restricted to "prevent them from engaging in any non-monopoly
business so as to eliminate the possibility that they might use their control over
exchange services to gain an improper advantage over competitors in such busi-
nesses." Id. at 143. The proposed Decree modified the final judgment of a Consent
Decree that had been entered into between the Justice Department and AT&T in
1956 which had terminated a prior antitrust action brought against AT&T in 1949
in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. AT&TDivestiture,
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the restrictions of the 1956 Consent Decree"' and allowed it to enter
the unregulated data processing field. 19 Contrary to the FCC's po-
sition in Computer II, however, the MFJ restricted AT&T from
engaging in electronic publishing pursuits over its transmission fa-
cilities for at least seven years.' 20 The seven Bell Operating Com-
55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 441. This decree was filed with the New Jersey
Court, which approved it and transferred the 1949 action to the District of Columbia
where it was consolidated with the 1974 action. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 143.
On August 11, 1982 the Court approved the proposed decree "as being in the
public interest" and specified that the following modifications be made:
(1) The BOCs be allowed to provide, but not manufacture, customer
premises equipment; (2) The BOCs be permitted to print and distribute
"the yellow pages"; (3) Restrictions on the BOC lines of business would
be removed if there was no substantial possibility that the BOC could
use its market power to impede competition in the market it was going
to enter; (4) AT&T be prohibited from engaging in "electronic publishing"
over its own transmission facilities for at least 7 years; (5) If an operating
company provides billing services to AT&T, it must include in the bill
a statement that there is no connection between the BOC and AT&T;
(6) Any BOC offering less-than-equal access to an interexchange carrier
must reflect the lesser cost, if any, of providing such access in its tariffs;
(7) At the time of divestiture the BOCs should have debt ratios of
approximately 4507o except for Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. which
should have a debt ratio of 50%.
AT&T Divestiture, 55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 442 n.21; see also Greene, Judge
Green on Telecommunications, Divestiture, the Government, the Courts and the
Future, TELEPHONY, Mar. 4, 1985, at 64 (personal comments of presiding Judge
Harold Greene); AFTER THE AT&T SETTLEMENT, THE NEW TELECOMUNICATIONs ERA
(Practicing Law Institute 1982).
118. AT&T Divestiture, 55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 441.
The [original action against AT&T] brought in 1949 had alleged various
violations of the Sherman Act and had sought the divestiture of Western
Electric from AT&T and the compulsory licensing of patents held by
AT&T on a nondiscriminatory basis. On January 24, 1956, the New
Jersey District Court accepted a Consent Decree that barred AT&T from
engaging in any business other than the provision of common carrier
services subject to public regulation and-services incidental thereto, barred
Western Electric from manufacturing any equipment other than that used
by the Bell System, and required AT&T and Western Electric to license
their patents to all applicants in exchange for royalty fees.
Id. at 441 n.17, citing United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH)
§ 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956).
119. The 1982 accord is viewed as a modification of the Final Judgment in the
1956 case. A T&TDivestiture, 55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 441. The effect of the modifica-
tion was to lift nearly all restrictions on AT&T's entry into unregulated lines of business.
See supra note 117.
120. AT&T Divestiture, 55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 467 n.125. Electronic
publishing is defined by the court as "the provision of any information which a
provider or publisher has, or has caused to be originated, authored, compiled,
collected, or edited, or in which he has a direct or indirect financial or proprietary
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panies,' 21 which the judgment divested from the AT&T corporate
core, are confined to a limited, regulated range of telecommunications
services,122 although they may provide transmission facilities to non-
affiliated companies for the distribution of enhanced services. 23 As
a result of the MFJ, the extensive capital and resources of the old
Bell system now are available, in splintered form, to the data proc-
essing industry for use in nationwide electronic publishing ventures.
By coupling these regulatory developments 24 with the technological
advancements of the computer revolution, the potential marketplace
for electronic publishing has been created.'25 However, while the
major access barriers have been broken, entrants can expect to be
met by a panoply of content, structural and economic regulations
which predate these recent developments. 2 6 Although the regulations
were designed for an age which could scarcely envision the present
technology, they may nevertheless be applied. This application poses
major legal and policy questions.
interest, and which is disseminated to an unaffiliated person through some electronic
means." AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 181. After seven years, AT&T may apply to the
court for the removal of this restriction. Id. at 186. But cf. In re Amendment of
Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer
Inquiry) (Tentative Decision), 72 F.C.C.2d 358, 428-29 (1979) (enabling AT&T to
enter all areas of enhanced services market).
121. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 139 n.19.
AT&T is the corporate parent of an integrated telecommunications net-
work known as the Bell System. This system, which provides the vast
majority of telecommunications services in the United States, is composed
of AT&T, which provides overall direction and control of the operating
divisions and companies; the Long Lines Department, which provides
interstate toll service; AT&T Information Systems, which provides cus-
tomer premises equipment (CPE) and enhanced services.
AT&T Divestiture, 55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 439.
AT&T Information Systems is the new name given to the former American
Bell, Inc. American Bell, Inc. was formed pursuant to the Commission's [FCC]
order in the Second Computer Inquiry, which required AT&T to offer customer
premises equipment and enhanced services through a separate subsidiary on a detariffed
basis. Id. at n.3. The Bell system also includes:
Western Electric, which manufactures telecommunications equipment; Bell
Telephone Laboratories (Bell Labs), which provides research and engi-
neering support for other parts of the company; AT&T International,
which markets products and services overseas; and the 24 BOC's [Operating
Companies], which provide local, intrastate toll, and some interstate toll,
service within their serving areas.
Id.
122. Id.
123. See supra note 113 for a definition of enhanced services.
124. See supra notes 107-23 and accompanying text.
125. Regulation of Electronic Publishing, supra note 8, at 332.
126. See infra notes 186-309 and accompanying text.
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IV. The Existing Models of Media Regulation
Although the first amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,'
' 27
these liberties are not absolute. 2 Rather, the Supreme Court has
consistently upheld various constraints in order to protect significant
countervailing interests. 129
127. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
128. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961); Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-
97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See generally N.Y. Times Book Rev., Feb.
24, 1985, at 10, col. 1 (reviewing L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PREss (1985));
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Schauer,
Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unravelling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L.
REV. 685, 725-31 (1978). For a concise discussion of the committment to first
amendment freedoms, as underscored by acceptance of their limitations, see Emer-
son, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955).
The Supreme Court has articulated a test for assessing the reasonableness of
such government limitations:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
Accordingly, the Court has permitted reasonable time, place and manner reg-
ulations if they serve a significant governmental interest and leave ample alternative
channels for communication. Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530, 535 (1980); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). Such regulation
may not be based on the content or the subject matter of the speech. Consolidated
Edison, 447 U.S. at 536.
Significant governmental interests which have been held to support the imposition
of government regulation include: (1) national security and public order, see, e.g.,
New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919); (2) judicial and political proceedings, see, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); and (3) public decency and morality, see
e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-2 to 12-36
(1978) (examining permissible abridgements of first amendment).
129. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). "All ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the
guarafties [of the First Amendment], unless excludable because they encroach upon
the limited area of more important interests." Id. at 484 (footnote omitted).
Constraints on the exercise of the freedoms of speech and press also have been
justified for a limited range of interests, bound by the overriding prohibition against
[Vol. XIII
ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING
Over the years, a model has emerged in which three distinct tiers
of communications freedom exist. 30 The press and the traditional
eighteenth century foral3 of speech and assembly occupy the premier,
prior restraint. See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714
(1971) (injunction against publication of Pentagon Papers seen as improper prior
restraint); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931) (statute which prohibited
engaging in the business of regularly or customarily producing, publishing or cir-
culating malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper found to be an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint of press); see also W. FRANCOIS, MASS MEDIA LAW AND REGULA-
TION 53, 61-80 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FRANCOIS], for other examples of prior
restraint cases. See generally Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central
Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981).
Although the generally protective stance, discussed supra with respect to the press
represents the longstanding majority interpretation of the first amendment, there
has also been a persistent minority view. Most recently, this minority view was
expressed in the opinions of Justices Hugo Black and William 0. Douglas who
viewed the first amendment in absolute terms. "I read 'no law ... abridging' to
mean no law abridging," wrote Justice Black in Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 157 (1959) (concurring opinion) (emphasis in original). "The First Amendment,
which is the supreme law of the land, has thus fixed its own value on freedom
of speech and press by putting these freedoms wholly 'beyond the reach' of federal
power to abridge." Id. at 157 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Black, The Bill
of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960); Countryman, Justice Douglas and Freedom
of Expression, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 301; Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the
First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REV. 428 (1967); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment
is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 263. While the writings of Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison have been cited in support of this absolutist position,
the strength of this support is tempered by an acknowledgement that their views
predated the application of the first amendment, via the fourteenth, to the states.
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 n.2 (1959) (Black, J., concurring). See N.Y.
Times Book Rev., Feb. 24, 1985, at 10, col. 1, citing L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A
FREE PRESS (1985), for the view that passionate absolutists such as Justice Black
are innocent or ignorant of the history of Revolutionary America and have "in
Mrs. Malaprop's phrase anticipated the past." Id.
130. See generally The New Video Marketplace, supra note 10.
131. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). Although,
the "use [of] the streets and parks ... may be regulated in the interest of all;
[the power to regulate] ... is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised
in subordination to the general comfort and convenience .... " Id.; see also Greer
v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 303-04 (1974); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969);
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229, 235-38 (1963); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951); Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414-17 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574
(1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939); Horning, The First Amendment
Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J. 931.
In Preferred Communications Inc. v. Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985),
the public forum doctrine was discussed as a check on government regulation. The
court recapitulated the principal, originally enunciated in Grayned v. Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 116 (1972), that "[tihe crucial question is whether the manner of expres-
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sion is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a par-
ticular time." Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1407. The court also noted
that simply opening property other than streets or parks to the public does not make
the facility an appropriate public forum. Rather, the place or its stated use must
make it appropriate for expression. Id. at 1407. See generally Goodale, 9th Circuit
May Have Impact on Constitutionality of Cable Act, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 25, 1985,
at 23, col. 1 (discussing impact of Preferred Communications on the 1984 Cable Act).
In Preferred Communications, the court discussed the three categories of public
property that have been identified by the Supreme Court. Preferred Communications,
754 F.2d at 1407-08. First, there are certain places, such as parks and public streets,
which traditionally have been devoted to speech and assembly. In such places, the
first amendment constrains the government's power to limit free expression. How-
ever, the government may impose content neutral regulations which serve a legitimate
government purpose and do not unnecessarily limit the ability to communicate
freely. To be constitutional, a content-based regulation must be justified by a
compelling state interest and be drawn narrowly to achieve that end. 754 F.2d at 1407.
The second category consists of property that the government has opened spe-
cifically to allow public expression. Id. at 1407. While the state is in no way obligated
to open a facility for such purposes indefinitely, if it chooses to do so, it must observe
the standards applicable to the first, traditional forum category. Id. at 1407-08.
The third category comprises property which is not a forum for public expression.
Id. at 1408. With respect to this final category, the state may impose regulations
which are reasonable as long as the regulation is not a guise for the suppression
of unfavorable views. Id.
The court held in Preferred Communications that public utility conduits and
poles are not traditional public fora. Id. at 1408. However, public property, which
falls within the third category, can still function as a public forum if the form of
expression is appropriate and compatible with the normal functioning of the location
at that time. Id. This principle is supported by the following cases and materials
which are cited in Nadel, A Unified Theory of the First Amendment: Divorcing
the Medium From the Message, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 194-95 n.117 (1982):
Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975) (airport); Wolin v. Port of New
York Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968)
(bus terminal); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (schools); Bonner-Lyons v. School Comm., 480 F.2d
442 (1st Cir. 1973) (school information distribution systems); Comment,
The University and the Public: The Right of Access by Nonstudents to
University Property, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 132 (1966); City of Madison
Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
429 U.S. 167 (1976) (public meeting of City Board of Education); South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipal
theatres); Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972) (per curiam)
(military reservation); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)
(State House grounds); Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d
1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974) (welfare office); United
States Servicemen's Fund v. Shands, 440 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1971) (public
auditoriums). But see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974) (transit system held not to be an open space or public place for
which first amendment guarantees access for all).
See also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (invalidating permit requirement
for public worship on city streets); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (over-
turning disorderly conduct conviction for holding religious meeting without permis-
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unregulated tier. I32 The broadcast medium occupies a second, regulated
tier, and common carriers, such as the telephone companies, occupy the
third possible regulatory level.
Each medium presents a possible model for the regulation of the new elec-
tronic publishers. The electronic press, which clearly had its historical ante-
cedents in the presses and pamphleteers of the 18th century,' 33 frequent-
ly functions as an electronic newspaper through bulletin boards and on-
line information services. By using telephone wires and over-the-air
satellite technology to transmit data, electronic publishers rely on,
and may function as common carriers, offering their services to
anyone with a telephone and a personal computer. Some of the
communications services which they provide, however, have been
held to fall within the wide range of activities regulated by the FCC
as ancillary to broadcasting. 3 4 Absent any clearly defined or legislated
classification, electronic publishers will likely be governed by ad hoc
policy incentives until a coherent national telecommunications agenda
is designed to deal with the digital world of electronic publishing.
A. The Press Model
In the sacrosanct position accorded the press, first amendment
freedoms are most scrupulously guarded.' The press is protected
by a long-standing and powerful tradition that keeping government's
hands off is the best way to achieve the national commitment to
sion of park commission); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (striking down
ordinance against use of sound amplification equipment not approved by police chief);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (voiding licensing requirement for
religious solicitation); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking down
municipal ordinance forbidding distribution of "literature of any kind" without prior
permission of city manager).
132. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) ("govern-
mental regulation of [the editorial] process .,. [is not] ... consistent with First Amend-
ment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time").
133. See generally TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM, supra note 77 (overview of ev-
olution of American communications media).
134. See 1983 Teletext Order, 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1309 (1983).
135. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980); Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) ("transcendent value"); Thomas v. Col-
lins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ("preferred place"); see also Address by William J.
Brennan, Jr., 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176 (1979) ("necessary for the existence of
our democracy").
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vigorous, uninhibited debate on public issues. 136 Courts repeatedly
have held that no governmental interference with the editorial func-
tions of the press may be countenanced under the first amendment.'"
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,38 the Supreme Court
stated that the "choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the
decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the
paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials-whether
fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judg-
ment."'' 9 Government interference in these processes was held to be
clearly inconsistent with the guarantees of the first amendment.140
However, some content regulation of the press is permissible,
136. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (Court voicing "a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public of-
ficials").
137. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1973); see
also United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
rev'd and remanded, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), rev'd and remanded,
403 U.S. 713 (1972) (per curiam) (reinstating judgment of district court). "A
cantankerous press, an obstinate press, an ubiquitous press must be suffered by
those in authority in order to preserve the even greater values of freedom of
expression and the right of the people to know." 328 F. Supp. at 331; accord
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
138. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
139. Id. at 258. The Supreme Court held that Florida's "right of reply" statute,
which required a newspaper to provide a political candidate with equal space to
answer press attacks and criticism of his record, was an unconstitutional violation
of the first amendment. Id. The statute, noted Justice White in his concurrence,
"runs afoul of the elementary First Amendment proposition that government may
not force a newspaper to print copy which, in its journalistic discretion, it chooses
to leave on the newsroom floor." Id. at 261 (White, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 258 ("[tlhe choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the
decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment
of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise
of editorial control and judgment"); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 124 (1973) ("For better or for worse, editing is what editors are for; and
editing is selection and choice of material."); Schuck v. Carroll, 247 N.W. 813,
815 (Iowa 1933) ("The newspaper business is . . .essentially private in its nature-
as private as that of the baker, grocer, or milkman, all of whom perform a service
on which to a greater or less extent, the communities depend, but which bears no
such relation to the public as to warrant its inclusion in the category of businesses
charged with the public use").
As a private enterprise, the press is limited by only two factors in its ability to
advance its own political, social and economic views. These factors are the ac-
ceptance of its views by a sufficient number of readers, and thus advertisers, to
ensure financial success and the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers.
See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 120-23 (1973). The loss of its
source of funds however, may as effectively silence a newspaper as enjoining its
publication. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 934 (1972). See generally F. SIEBERT, THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE
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although, traditionally, such regulations were based on state rather
than federal proscriptions. 4 ' The most significant examples are those
regarding defamation and obscenity. 42 Incidental regulation of the
business, as opposed to the communications, aspect of the press 43
also has been upheld with regard to the application of tax, 144 labor 145
and antitrust laws. 4
6
1. Defamation
One of the most significant constraints on the freedom of the
PRESS (1970) (reviewing historical rights of press).
141. See infra notes 142-81 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 147-81 and accompanying text.
143. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)(holding that membership restrictions of Associated Press' by-laws violated anti-
trust prohibitions of Sherman Act; "the mere fact that a person is engaged in
publishing, does not exempt him from ordinary municipal law, so long as he remains
unfettered, in his own selection of what to publish"); accord Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972) (incidental regulation of press is constitutionally per-
missible); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212 (4th Cir. 1972) (economic
regulation of press is permissible).
144. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); Giragi v. Moore,
58 P.2d 1249 (Sup. Ct. Ariz. 1936), appeal dismissed, 301 U.S. 670 (1937); North
American Publications, Inc. v. Director, Dep't of Revenue, 436 So. 2d 954 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. 1983); Del Val Pennysaver, Inc. v. Division of Taxation, 188 N.J. Super.
108, 456 A.2d 115 (1983). But see Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (Minnesota's ink and paper tax violates
first amendment by singling out press without adequate justification).
145. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); see also Mabee v. White
Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946) (upholding constitutionality of applying
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 9, 11(a) (1982), to newspaper publishing
industry).
146. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for freedom
of the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should
be read as a command that the government was without power to protect
that freedom .... Surely a command that the government itself shall
not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental
combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally
guaranteed freedom . . . . Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the
Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is
not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First
Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private
interests.
Id. at 20 (footnote omitted); see also Levitch v. CBS, 495 F. Supp. 649, 661-62
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). But see Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594, 605 (1953); Fitzgerald v. National Rifle Assoc., 383 F. Supp. 162 (D.N.J. 1974);
America's Best Cinema Corp. v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 328
(N.D. Ind. 1972); PMP Assoc., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 321 N.E.2d 915 (Mass.
1975). Compare Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) with
Newspaper Preservations Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1982).
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press is the law of defamation. 47 Defamation law erodes the first
amendment freedoms of speech and press in order to protect the
interests of truth and personal reputation.14 A defamatory statement
has been defined as an unprivileged false statement that has a
tendency to injure the defamed individual's good name and reputation
and is published to one or more persons. 149 Once distinguished as
slander or libel, depending on the oral or printed nature of the
publication, 150 defamation law has been affected by the development
of mass communications media such as radio, television, film, cable,
and satellite which have overwhelmed these longstanding distinc-
tions.' 5
Where the printed press is concerned, however, the threshold
question is whether and when the publisher may be held accountable
for defamatory publications.' 52
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan in 1964,' 53 defamatory statements were outside the scope of
first amendment protection. 54 Instead, such statements were governed
by state tort laws' and criminal libel laws.'5 6 At common law, a
147. Meyer v. Joint Council 53 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 316 Pa. 401, 412-13,
206 A.2d 382, 388 (1965).
148. Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 557-58, 117
A.2d 889, 891 (1955) (defamation law can conflict with counter-policy favoring
free speech and press).
149. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964). This decision
adds to the traditional libel defenses, which include truth, qualified privileges, and
fair comment criticism, a first amendment qualified privilege for news media which
criticize public officials. FRANCOIS, supra note 129, at 117.
150. RESTATEMENT-TORTS, supra note 21, § 559; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § Ill, at 771 (1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER
& KEETON].
151. See infra notes 258-65 for a discussion of the merging of slander and libel.
152. See infra notes 153-73 and accompanying text. Since the first amendment
guarantee is "not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all
of us," it may sometimes be held accountable for its false and defamatory statements.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (calculated falsehoods do not enjoy constitutional protection);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("the
liberty of the press is no greater and no less than the liberty of every . . . citizen
of the Republic"); FRANCOIS, supra note 129, at 40-41 (listing areas in which press
may be held accountable and unprotected by first amendment); id. at 89, 245 (privacy
law also constrains freedom of the press).
153. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
154. FRANCOIS, supra note 129, at 117.
155. Id. at 91.
156. Id. at 121-25. For cases involving criminal libel statutes, see Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 261, reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 988 (1952) (statute to "curb
false or malicious defamation of racial and religious groups"); Garrison v. Loui-
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defamation defendant could be held strictly liable where the plaintiff
was able to establish three elements: the statement must have been
published to a third person; the defamed individual or group must
have been identifiable; and the statement must have been both false
and injurious to reputation.157 The defenses to a defamation suit
available at common law include the truth of the statement,'
privilege'59 and fair comment. 160
Privileges are no longer solely within the province of state common
law.' 61 With its decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme
Court created a federal constitutional privilege for certain defamatory
siana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (New York Times rule limits state's power to criminal-
ly sanction criticism of public officials).
157. RESTATEMENT-TORTS, supra note 21, § 569 comment a; Eaton, The American
Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical
Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1353 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Eaton]. Initially,
at common law, defamation was a strict liability tort because of society's "pervasive
and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation." Rosenblatt
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966). Strict liability was the traditional common law
rule for several important reasons. First, injury to one's reputation was exceedingly
difficult to prove. Locating witnesses, pinpointing changes in their business or
personal relations with the plaintiff, and establishing a causal connection between
the defamation and these changes could be nearly impossible. A requirement that
plaintiffs establish these elements in order to recoup compensatory damages would
render the action for defamation futile. Eaton, supra, at 1537. Under this theory,
a plaintiff who could not show pecuniary losses was entitled to nominal damages
as long as he could establish the publication of a defamatory falsehood. Id. at 1538
(citing RESTATEMENT-TORTS, supra note 21, § 569 comment c). Another reason sup-
porting the strict liability theory derived from the fact that mass distribution of a
defamation via newspaper created an enormous risk of accidental injury. This risk
was comparable to the risk posed by "highly desirable but necessarily dangerous"
instrumentalities for which strict liability was the law. Eaton, supra, at 1359. Most
important, strict liability for defamation was justified as an inducement to the truthful
dissemination of information. "Since the effect of a defamatory falsehood ... is
the same whether the statement is an intentional lie or an innocent mistake, the com-
mon law seeks to deter both by placing the burden of proving the truth on the
defamer . . . ." Id. at 1358.
158. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 150, at 839-40.
159. Id. at 815-16.
160. Id. at 831-32.
161. 376 U.S. at 279-80. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan noted
that a state must safeguard the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the first
amendment and applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 277.
"The constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not." Id. at 279-80. Actual malice does not mean ill will as in the old
common law, but rather scienter. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1964)
(state statute permitting liability for statement about public official made with
common law malice or ill will struck down). Public officials have been held to
include those elected to office, and "at the very least to [include] those among the
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publications, holding that defamatory publications about public of-
ficials are only actionable if made with actual malice. 162 Malice is
defined as knowledge, or reckless disregard for the truth. 63 Absent
such a showing, the publication is privileged.' 64 This conditional
privilege and its accompanying actual malice standard subsequently
were extended to apply to publications about public figures.' 65
The common law standards controlling the law of defamation
were not uniformly applied to each link in the defamatory chain. A
primary publisher, such as a newspaper, employs individuals who par-
ticipate in the defamation by gathering, writing and disseminating
information. 'I Each of these participants in the publication process, for
example, reporters, copy editors, news directors and the corporate entity
itself, could be held liable for "publication" of a defamatory falsehood. 117
On the other hand, secondary publishers, which include libraries,
news vendors, distributers, and carriers, are not liable for the def-
amation unless it is established that they changed the communication
and knew or had reason to know of the defamatory nature of the
statement. 6 The rationale behind this distinction is that these pub-
lishers usually are unaware of the defamatory nature of the message
and are not in a position to halt or alter the harm. 69
A republisher 170 of defamatory material also may be held liable
since he made a conscious decision to publish the material just as
hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have,
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs."
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (footnote omitted).
162. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
163. See supra note 161.
164. Id.
165. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (football coach
accused in publication of cheating must show "actual malice" to recover damages).
166. The primary publishers, [tihose who manufacture books by way of printing
and selling them, and those who print and sell newspapers, magazines, journals,
and the like, are subject to liability ... because they have the opportunity to
know the content of the material being published and should therefore be subject
to the same liability rules as are the author and originator of the written material."
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 150, at 810.
167. Thornton, Gerlach & Gibson, Libel in Videotex Symposium, 36 FED. COM.
L.J. 178, 179 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Thornton, Gerlach & Gibson]. "[Elveryone
who takes part in the publication, as in the case of the owner, editor, printer, ven-
dor, or even carrier of a newspaper is charged with publication . . . ." PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 150, at 799 (footnotes omitted).
168. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 150, at 810-11.
169. Thornton, Gerlach & Gibson, supra note 167, at 179.
170. A republisher is one who publishes material that he did not write and that
was previously published by another. Id.
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the primary publisher did. 7' The degree of responsibility of primary
publishers, secondary publishers and republishers thus appears to be
based upon and proportional to their discretion regarding publication
decisions.172 The standards against which their liabilities are measured
reflect these various degrees of responsibility. 73
2. Obscenity
A constitutional concept of obscenity was first enunciated in Roth
v. United States, 74 in which Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
stated that "[t]he dispositive question is whether obscenity is utterance
within the area of protected speech and press.' ' 75 He answered this
question in the negative because obscene speech is "utterly without
redeeming social importance."'' 76 In Roth, the Court proffered a test
to be used in distinguishing obscene materials from those which are
to be accorded first amendment protection: 7 7 obscene material was
that in which the dominant theme appealed to the prurient interest
of an average person applying contemporary community standards. 7 1
171. Id.
172. Id. at 180.
173. Id.
174. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Samuel Roth, a dealer in erotica, published, advertised
and sold through the mails, monthly magazines such as Good Times, A Review
of the World of Pleasure, a quarterly called American Aphrodite, and photograph
collections such as French Nudes at Play and Wallet Nudes. Lockhart & McClure,
Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L.
REV. 5, 19 & n.80 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Censorship of Obscenity]. Roth was
convicted of violating a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1952), which prohibited
the mailing of obscene matter. 354 U.S. at 480. After his conviction was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956), the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 352 U.S. 964.
175. 354 U.S. at 481 (footnote omitted). Dicta in earlier cases indicated that the
"lewd and obscene" were among "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech" unprotected by the Constitution. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
255-56 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). This
exclusion from first amendment protection was justified on the ground that such
utterances were of such little social value that any benefit derived was outweighed
by society's interest in order and morality. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (citing Z.
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149 (1941)).
176. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484; Censorship of Obscenity, supra note 174, at 27. In
a later decision, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), Justice Burger stated:
"[T]o equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with
commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the
First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom." Id.
at 34.
177. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89.
178. Id. at 489. The Court expressly rejected the rule of Regina v. Hicklin, [1868]
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
In Miller v. California,7 9 the Court attempted to refine the def-
inition of obscenity and to determine the permissible scope of state
and federal regulation. 80 Three basic guidelines were set forth for
the trier of fact to consider in determining whether published material
is obscene and therefore not protected by the first amendment: "(a)
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."'' A
publication deemed obscene under this test may be restricted by the
government and the actions of its publisher restrained.
B. Broadcast Regulation
The first amendment's guarantee of a free press'82 embodies two
correlative goals: (1) that publishers be free from government cen-
sorship;'83 and (2) that the public be exposed to diverse and robust
communication.8 4 The general restraint exercised by the government
with respect to the print media represents the optimal balance of
these two goals. For a variety of reasons with respect to the broadcast
L.R. 3. Q.B. 360, which determined obscenity merely by the effect of the material
on any person, regardless of particular sensibilities. Id.
179. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
180. Id. at 24-25.
181. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
182. See supra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
183. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976) ("The
primary concern of [the first amendment] is that there be full opportunity for
expression in all of its varied forms to convey a desired message. Vital to this
concern is the corollary that there be full opportunity for everyone to receive the
message."); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) ("free speech includes a
right to communicate a person's views to any willing listener"); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (acknowledging the clear first amendment rights of
newspapers and electronic media to disseminate ideas and information) (Stewart,
J., dissenting); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring) ("In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the
free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy.
The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government's power
to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to
censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets
of government and inform the people."); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 442 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring and dissenting).
184. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) ("First Amendment protection . . . [is] enjoyed by . . .
recipients of the information, and not solely ... [by those] who seek to disseminate
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media, the right of the public to receive published materials has
been held to be paramount to the broadcaster's right to publish."s5
1. The Communications Act of 1934
Broadcasting, which is regulated under the Communications Act
of 1934 (Communications Act), 86 is defined therein as the "dissemina-
tion of radio communications intended to be received by the public,
directly or by the intermediary of relay stations."' 87 The Communica-
tions Act was designed to regulate and limit the multitude of voices
that information"); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) (right
of viewers and listeners is "paramount" to the rights of broadcasters); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("it is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market place of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail"); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart,
J., concurring) ("[the Constitution protects more than just a man's freedom to say
or write or publish what he wants. It secures as well the liberty of each man to
decide for himself what he will read and to what he will listen."); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (first amendment includes "right to receive
[and] the right to read"); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, J.) ("[Tihe First Amendment . . . presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many, this is, and always will be,
folly; but we have staked upon it our all."). See generally Bazelon, supra note 10,
at 203-04.
185. See infra notes 186-224 and accompanying text. The essence of the distinction
between the treatment accorded to the press and the broadcasting media is expressed
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted
to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be
expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their
interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the
medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First
Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters, which is paramount. It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization
of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private
licensee . . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to
social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which
is crucial here.
Id. at 390 (citations omitted); see also Writers Guild of Am. v. ABC, 609 F.2d
355, 362 (1979) (in conflict of interest among television "licensees,-networks, broad-
casters, writers, actors, producers, and the public, it must be remembered that the
Communications Act makes the interests of the public paramount"), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 824 (1980).
186. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982).
187. Id. § 153(o). Radio communication means transmission by radio of writing,
signs, signals, pictures and sounds of all kinds, including all instrumentalities, facilities,
apparatus and services incidental to such transmission, as well as television transmis-
sions. 47 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1982); see Standard Radio & Television Co. v. Chronicle
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
exploding onto the airwaves by 1934.188 Engineering chaos threatened
the radio spectrum.' 8 9 A licensing system was instituted to limit the
number of broadcasters and thereby prevent etheric bedlam.' 90
In order to compensate the public for the excluded voices, however,
the Act imposed a concept of "public trusteeship" upon the li-
censees. 191
[T]he First Amendment confers no right . . . to an unconditional
monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied
to others the right to use .... It does not violate the First
Amendment to [give] licensees [who are] given the privilege of
using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire community,
[an obligation] to give suitable time and attention to matters of
great public concern.' 9
Publishing Co., 182 Cal. App. 2d 293, 6 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1960); see also United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172 (1968) (FCC given " 'regulatory
power over all forms of electrical communication' ") (citation omitted); Allen B.
Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, 155 (3rd Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 929 (1951).
188. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1943). This case, affirming the
FCC's power to regulate chain broadcasting, is generally regarded as the "touchstone"
for measuring the constitutionality of FCC regulation. Robinson, The FCC and
the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation,
52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 86 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Robinson]. The Communications
Act was based on the Radio Act of 1927, 47 U.S.C. §§ 81-119 (1928) (repealed
June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1102); see supra notes 89-92.
Before 1927, the allocation of [radio] frequencies was left entirely to the
private sector, and the result was chaos. It quickly became apparent that
broadcast frequencies constituted a scarce resource .... [needing] gov-
ernment control [or] the medium would be of little use because of the
cacophony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and
predictably heard.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1969) (footnotes omit-
ted). See generally Davis, The Radio Act of 1927, 13 VA. L. REV. 611 (1927).
189. NBC, 319 U.S. at 210-214.
190. 67 CONG. REC. 5479 (1926). "The plight into which radio fell prior to 1927 was
attributable to certain basic facts about radio as a means of communication-its facilities
are limited; they are not available to all who may wish to use them; the radio spec-
trum simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody . . . .In its essentials
the Communications Act of 1934 . . .derives from the Federal Radio Act of 1927."
NBC, 319 U.S. at 213-14 (citing FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134,
137 (1940); see also CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 104 (1973)).
191. CBS, 412 U.S. at 117, 118 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); see also In re Wharton
Comm. Inc., 29 RMD. REG. 2d (P & F) 81, 87 (1973); In re Prattville Broadcasting
Co., 8 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 120, 130 (1966); In re KWK Radio Inc., 25 RAD.
REG. 2d (P & F) 577, 583 (1963), aff'd sub nom. KWK Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 337
F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 910 (1965). But see Brennan,
Economic Efficiency and Broadcast Content Regulation, 35 FED. COM. L.J. 117 (1983);
Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEXAs L.
REV. 207, 213 [hereinafter cited as Fowler & Brenner].




Various affirmative obligations, which have been imposed on
broadcasters under this "scarcity" rationale, 193 have withstood the
first amendment challenge.194 Implicit in each obligation is the notion
that government regulation of broadcasting will best promote the
dissemination of diverse ideas which is encouraged by the first
amendment.195 Under this rationale, broadcasters have been subjected
to regulations such as the Fairness Doctrine 96 and to the equal access
[t]o condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a willingness to
present representative community views on controversial issues is consistent
with the ends and purposes of those constitutional provisions forbidding
the abridgment of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Congress
need not stand idly by and permit those with licenses to ignore the
problems which beset the people or to exclude from the airways anything
but their own views of fundamental questions. The statute, long ad-
ministrative practice, and cases are to this effect.
Id. at 394.
The public convenience, interests and necessity standard of 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) resulted
in a licensing standard under which the FCC chooses licensees, based in part on
their programming proposals. This standard and the concomitant regulations have
been upheld in accordance with the unequivocal recognition "that the Commission
was more than a traffic policeman concerned with the technical aspects of broad-
casting and that it neither exceeded its powers under the statute nor transgressed
the First Amendment in interesting itself in general program format and the kinds
of programs broadcast by licensees." Id. at 394-95 (citations omitted).
193. See id. at 376-77; see also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (FCC
has power to impose regulations upon broadcast stations in the public interest);
Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en
banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (limits associated with scarcity of broadcast
frequencies are necessary "to prevent total anarchy in the broadcast media") (footnote
omitted). In order to meet the public interest, the desires and the needs of the commu-
nity in which the station is located, a station should attend to the following major
elements, which were developed by the industry and approved by the FCC: (1)
opportunity for local self-expression; (2) development and use of local talent; (3)
programs for children; (4) religious programs; (5) educational programs; (6) public
affairs programs; (7) editorialization by licensees; (8) political broadcasting; (9)
agricultural programs; (10) news programs; (11) weather and market reports; (12)
sports programs; (13) service to minority groups; and (14) entertainment programs.
Goldberg & Couzens, supra note 20, at 13 n.48.
194. National Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers & Distributors v. FCC, 516
F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1975); Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc); Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
195. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1959); see
American Sec. Council Educ. Found. v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001
(D.C. Cir. 1976); NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 910 (1976).
196. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) provides:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate
for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
19851
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requirements for political candidates. 197 Community needs were to
be ascertained, 98 and controversial public interest programming pre-
sented. 199
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of
such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no
power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of
this section. No obligation is imposed under this subsection upon any
licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate. Appearance
by a legally qualified candidate on any-
(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate
is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by
the news documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not
limited to political conventions and activities incidental thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the mean-
ing of this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be con-
strued as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of
newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage
of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this Act
to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for
the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982). The following cases support the notion that the goal
of the Fairness Doctrine is to promote the right of the public to be informed and
to be apprised of different attitudes and viewpoints on controversial issues of public
importance. American Sec. Council Educ. Found. v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); Public Media Center v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1978); NBC
v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976); see also
47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1984).
The Fairness Doctrine imposes an affirmative obligation on the broadcaster to
provide coverage of issues of public importance which is adequate and fairly reflects
differing viewpoints. The broadcaster must provide free time for the presentation
of opposing views if no paying sponsor is available, Cullman Broadcasting Co.,
25 RAD. REG. (P & F) 895 (1963), and must initiate public issue programming if
no other source does so. John J. Dempsey, 6 RAD. REG. (P & F) 615 (1950). The
evolution of the Fairness Doctrine and its component obligations is discussed at
length in Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 375-79.
The subsidiary personal attack rule provides that "[wihen, during the presentation
of views on a controversial issue of public importance, an attack is made upon
the honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person,"
the licensee must notify the person attacked and provide an opportunity to respond.
47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1984); see also 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982) (political access
requirement); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1984) (political editorials requirement). See
generally Chamberlin, The FCC and The First Principle of the Fairness Doctrine:
A History of Neglect and Distortion, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 361 (1979) (discussing develop-
ment of the Fairness Doctrine and its subsequent interpretations by the judiciary);
Downs & Karpen, The Equal Time and Fairness Doctrines: Outdated or Crucial to
American Politics in the 1980s, 4 COMM/ENT 67 (1981) (stressing continued utility
of the Fairness Doctrine in contemporary broadcasting).
197. See infra note 201; 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940 (1984).
198. Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission en banc Programing Inquiry,
22 RAD. REG. (P & F) 1901, 1912 (1960).
199. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1984). The original programming requirements were
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Public affairs and childrens' programming is mandated by the
FCC's regulations, 200 as is reasonable access for candidates for elective
office.20 1 Television programming guidelines have been upheld 202 as
have prohibitions against overcommercialization, 203 lotteries,2 °4 rigged
contests, 205 and failure to disclose consideration paid for broadcast
material .26 The FCC monitors broadcasters' adherence to these public
trustee obligations through its comparative renewal process. 207 All
licensees are required to periodically demonstrate to the FCC that
they are complying with its regulations .20  Broadcast market entry
by prospective licensees similarly is regulated in the public interest,
20 9
contained in the infamous Blue Book, FCC PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF
BROADCAST LICENSEES 55 (1946). See Robinson, supra note 188, at 111.
200. 47 C.F.R. § 73.4050 (1984). See generally Roberson, Mandatory Program-
ming Rules for Children's Television, 3 COMM/ENT 701 (1981) (discussing desirability
of mandatory programming for children).
201. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940 (1984). See generally Geller
& Yurow, The Reasonable Access Provision (312(a)(7)) of the Communications Act:
Once More Down the Slippery Slope, 34 FED. Com. L.J. 389 (1982) (discussing
development and judicial interpretations of reasonable access provision).
202. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 480 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (upholding FCC's 1974 Policy Statement which required increased childrens'
programming as condition to license renewal); see also Report and Statement of
Policy Res: Commission en banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2307-08
(1960) (FCC does not view itself as barred by Constitution or statute from exercing
any responsibility with respect to programming). See supra note 193 for a list of items
to be included among a broadcasting station's programming. See also Action for
Children's Television, 58 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 61 (1985) (Commission declines to act
on complaints regarding program length commercialization in animated childrens'
programs starring syndicated characters).
203. 47 C.F.R. § 73.4010 (1983) (removed in entirety in 49 Fed. Reg. 33,604 (1984)).
204. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1211 (1984); 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982).
205. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1216 (1984).
206. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.4242, 73.4180, 73.1212 (1984); 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1982).
207. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965). See generally Lindemann, Simon Geller and the
Comparative Renewal Process, 6 COMM/ENT 185 (1983); Kuklin, Continuing Confusion:
The Renewal of Broadcast Licenses, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 95 (1983).
208. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c) (1982); see, e.g., Cosmopolitan Broadcasting Corp.
v. FCC, 581 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Brandywine Main Line Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Sharp & Lively, Can the Broadcaster in the Black Hat Ride Again? "Good
Character" Requirements for Broadcast Licensees, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 173 (1980).
209. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1982); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969) (Congress has power to grant and deny broadcasting licenses and to
close existing stations); see also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582,
595-96 (1981) (FCC's decision not to regulate but to allow marketplace to determine
entertainment programming is compatible with its mandate to serve public interest);
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978) (FCC
may regulate and allocate licenses for broadcast frequencies to promote "public
interest").
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and various multiple ownership and cross-ownership restrictions have
been imposed. 210
In addition to the scarcity rationale, broadcast regulation also has
been upheld based on the pervasive nature of the medium, 2 1 and
its special impact on the American public.21 2 In FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 2 1 the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's power
to regulate the publication of indecent speech214 over broadcasting
frequencies. 25 The Court stated that while the "seven dirty words ' 21 6
which were spoken on the offending radio show were protected
under the first amendment, 27 the Commission's interpretation of 18
U.S.C. section 1464, which prohibited the broadcast of indecent, as
210. 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1982). FCC restrictions on broadcast ownership have been
upheld by the Supreme Court as a legitimate means of ensuring a continued diversity
of voices over the broadcast spectrum. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 794-95 (1978); United States v. Storer Broadcasting
Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).
See generally Comment, Media Cross-Ownership, Effective Enforcement of the
Antitrust Laws and the FTC, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 105 (1980).
In February, 1985, the FCC affirmed its abrogation of the previously controlling
"seven station rule" and expanded permissible multiple broadcast ownership under
the 12-12-12 formula which provides that a person or company could own a
maximum of 12 AM stations, 12 FM stations and 12 television stations. In re
Amendment of § 73.3555 [formerly §§ 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636] of the Commission's
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations,
57 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 966, 968-69 (1985). The FCC modified its original
position by adding an audience reach cap and a minority preference provision to
its original rule. Id. at 969 (limiting access of TV station owners to no more than
25 percent of national audience; minority ownership of broadcast facilities to be
promoted).
211. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
212. Id.
213. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court noted that
broadcasting required special treatment because of the four following considerations:
(1) children have access to radios and in many cases their use of radio is unsupervised
by parents; (2) radio receivers are in homes, where privacy interests are entitled
to special protection (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)); (3)
unconsenting adults may tune in to a station without warning that offensive language
is being, or will be, broadcast; and (4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space; public
interest necessitates the licensing of broadcasters. Id. at 731 n.2.
214. See infra notes 267-277 and accompanying text.
215. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(1982); see also 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6) (1982) (FCC may revoke station licenses for
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1464). Accordingly, the Court upheld sanctions against
Pacifica Station WBAI for broadcasting the George Carlin "seven dirty words"
monologue. 438 U.S. at 751.
216. The Court's opinion does not delineate the offending words. They are
contained in the Appendix to the decision. 438 U.S. at 751 app.
217. 438 U.S. at 744.
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well as obscene speech 2 1 was constitutional. 219
Under Pacifica,2 2 0 broadcast regulation, which is justified by the
medium's unique impact on the American public 22 is necessary to
protect this "captive audience ' 222 from unwanted invasions of pri-
vacy. 223 A significant factor in the Court's decision was the unique
accessibility of the broadcast medium to children.2 24
3. Deregulation
Although the authority of the FCC to regulate the content,225
structure2 2 6 and technical aspects227 of broadcasting is clear,22 8 the
Commission also is authorized to refrain from imposing permissible
regulations and to "unregulate" areas previously constrained.2 29 In
218. See supra note 215.
219. 438 U.S. at 750-51.
220. Id. at 726.
221. Id. at 748-49.
222. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (" '[wie are often
"captives" outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech.'
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse
solely to protect others from hearing it is ... dependent upon a showing that
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.")
(quoting Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)); Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("a child-
like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for
individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees")
(quoting Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968)). See generally Report on
the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent and Obscene Material, 32 RAD. REG. 2d (P &
F) 1367, 1373 (1975); Comment, Morality and Broadcasting: FCC Control of
"Indecent" Material Following Pacifica, 31 FED. CoM. L.J. 145 (1978).
223. 438 U.S. at 748-49.
224. Id. at 749; see supra note 222.
225. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943).
226. See supra note 210.
227. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1213-73.1750 (1984).
228. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 387 (regulation of
use of broadcast equipment); id. at 388 (regulation of radio spectrum to reserve
portions for important uses); id. at 390 (authority of FCC to regulate radio frequency
licensees); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707
F.2d 1413, 1427, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (FCC's requirement that broadcast licensees
"provide programming responsive to community issues" based on its mandate to
promote public interest; licensees have "some affirmative obligation to present
informational programming") (emphasis in original).
229. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3597 (1984); 47 Fed. Reg. 55,930 (1982) (statement by FCC
Chairman Fowler that abrogation of license "trafficking" rules was "a true block-
buster in the unregulation process"); see also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450
U.S. 582, 595-96 (1981) (public interest best served by FCC refraining from regulating
entertainment programming); Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding the FCC's
deregulation of radio). See generally Fowler & Brenner, supra note 191.
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recent years, an open market approach has been evinced by the
FCC 230 as the scarcity rationale 2 1 has come under increasing attack. 23 2
The development of FM radio, broadcast and subscription tele-
vision, cable, satellite, microwave and low-power broadcasting tech-
nologies belie the 1934 scarcity assumptions and compound the
multiplicity of voices competing for a market share in 1985.233 A
communications environment has been created which was unimagined
in 1943, when Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Supreme Court,
stated that the "radio spectrum simply is not large enough to
accommodate everyone. ' 234 Accordingly, in June, 1984, the FCC
deregulated commercial television by eliminating non-entertainment
programming and commercial logging guidelines; 235 removing the
formal ascertainment requirements for commercial licensees; 23 6 de-
230. Fowler, Foreword to The New Video Marketplace, supra note 10, at 523-
24 (discussing movement by FCC and Congress away from "public trusteeship"
approach to broadcast regulation, toward an approach more responsive to market
forces).
231. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
232. See Bazelon, supra note 10, at 207. The inherent limitations of the radio
spectrum which provided the touchstone for the Radio Act and the 1934 Com-
munications Act, if valid at all in 1927 or 1934, are clearly not valid in 1985. See
The New Video Marketplace, supra note 10, at 562-66.
The dramatic media changes which have taken place since the scarcity rationale
was first articulated underscore its current weaknesses. An eightfold increase in radio
stations since 1934 has taken place, along with the development of FM and television
stations which followed the enactment of the Communications Act. Id. at 563. In
1983, an estimated 2807o of American households received ten or more broadcast
television signals; 80% received at least five. Id. at 564. VHF frequencies are
supplemented by UHF frequencies, lowpower television, direct broadcast satellites,
subscription television, cable, multipoint distribution service, videocassettes and
videodiscs. Id. These alternatives to conventional radio and television broadcasting
undermine the scarcity rationale and highlight the market opportunities beyond the
traditional broadcast spectrum. Additionally, technological developments may permit
a more efficient use of the available spectrum through multiplexing, compression
and subcarrier operations. Id. at 565-66. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450
U.S. at 590, for an acknowledgment of the 'bewildering array of diversity' in
entertainment formats which inhabits the radio broadcast spectrum. But see NBC
v. United States, 319 U.S. at 213 ("the radio spectrum simply is not large enough
to accommodate everybody. There is a fixed natural limitation upon the number
of stations that can operate without interfering with one another") (footnote omitted).
233. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
234. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. at 213.
235. In re The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, As-
certainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Tele-
vision Stations, 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1005, 1006-07 (1984); In re Revision of
Program Policies and Reporting Requirements Related to Public Broadcasting Li-
censees, 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1157, 1160-61 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Public
Broadcasting Deregulation].
236. 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1005 (1984).
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leting commercialization levels from its future inquiries into license
applications; replacing the detailed program log requirement
237 with
a generalized quarterly response; and eliminating the long form
renewal audit which had been used to assess licensee performance.
21
Public broadcasters similarly were relieved of many of their regulatory
obligations under the terms of a companion ruling. 23 9 Complete
deregulation of television is a viable possibility in the coming months.
This television deregulation followed the 1981 radio deregulation
proceedings under which the FCC dropped non-entertainment pro-
gramming guidelines and restricted ascertainment, 240 logging, and
commercialization regulations. 24l Numerous broadcasting "under-
brush" rules242 were also recently dropped in the spirit of deregulation
and administrative simplification.2 43
One of the more significant aspects of the recent deregulation is
the current FCC examination of the continued viability of the Fairness
Doctrine. 2" Elimination of this doctrine would be a monumental
acknowledgement of the end of scarcity and would accord with the
increasingly apparent FCC attitude toward regulation. This approach
was enunciated in the Public Broadcast Deregulation 245 in which the
FCC emphasized its conversion to the market approach of broadcast
regulation, stating that the FCC "should regulate only where social
237. Id. at 1006.
238. Public Broadcasting Deregulation, supra note 235, at 1158.
239. Id.
240. In re Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 49 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F)
1, 5, 11, reconsideration denied, 87 F.C.C.2d 797, 50 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 93
(1981); see Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ, 707 F.2d
1413, 1436-42 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
241. 49 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) at 5.
242. In re Elimination of Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation, 54 RAD. REG. 2d
(P & F) 1043, 1046 (1983). Underbrush rules relate to "the accumulation of policies,
doctrines, declaratory rulings, interpretive statements . . .that [have] 'grown up'
around major regulations over the years." 54 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) at 1046.
243. 54 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) at 1047.
244. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982). See California Public Broadcasting Forum v. FCC,
57 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 899 (1985), for an extensive review of the FCC proceedings
held on February 7 and 8, 1985 to examine the continued viability of the Fairness
Doctrine. The explosive growth in alternative communications fora has been cited
as a basis for eliminating the Doctrine, which was intended to ensure the adequate
airing of diverse viewpoints. See supra note 196; see also The Great Debate on
Fairness is a Little Less Than That, BROADCASTING, Feb. 11, 1985, at 30, 32; The
Fairness Doctrine Debated, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1985, at C32. The power of the
FCC to abrogate a codified policy such as the Fairness Doctrine, absent Congres-
sional authorization, is not clear. See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
245. 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1157, 1161-65 (1984).
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and market forces are unlikely to ensure service in the public in-
terest."" The most pressing question now is whether the FCC has the
authority to abrogate the statutory Fairness Doctrine, absent Congress-
sional authorization, not whether it is wise to do so.
4. The Impact of Defamation Law on the Broadcast Media
In addition to these administratively imposed content regulations,
the broadcast media, in their role as publishers, are governed by
the judicial constraints of defamation 247 and obscenity law. 248 In
Farmers Union v. WDA y,249 these two controls overlapped when
the Supreme Court held that section 315 of the Communications
Act 250 barred broadcasters from censoring defamatory .statements
made during radio transmissions by political candidates.' As a
consequence, the Court held that a broadcast licensee is immune
from liability for any defamation which is published over its facilities
as required by section 315.252 Inasmuch as the intent of section 315 was
to encourage the broadcasting of political debate, 2" it would be unrea-
246. Id. at 1162, J 17; see 1983 Teletext Order, 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1309,
1324 59 (Fairness Doctrine inapplicable to teletext because scarcity rationale not
viable with respect to this medium).
247. See Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 530-42 (1959) (broadcaster
is immune from liability for defamatory statements made by candidates for political
office when the broadcaster is required to provide the candidate with airtime. However,
broadcaster may be held liable for defamations where statements not made during broad-
casts which station is required to air); Note, Developments in the Law-Defamation,
69 HARv. L. REv. 875, 907-10 (1956).
248. See, e.g., Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
249. 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
250. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1934). See supra notes 186-224 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this Act.
251. Farmers Union, 360 U.S. at 527-31.
252. Id. at 531-35; Lamb v. Sutton, 274 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1960) (Federal
Communications Act of 1934 bars radio and television broadcasting stations from
removing defamatory statements from speeches broadcast by legally qualified can-
didates for public office, and grants federal immunity for libelous statements so
broadcast).
253. Farmers Union, 360 U.S. at 528-29. The legislative history of section 315
also indicates a deep hostility to censorship either by the FCC or by the broadcast
licensee.
The flat prohibition against the licensee of any station exercising any
censorship authority over any political or public question discussion is
retained and emphasized. This means that the Commission cannot itself
or by rule or regulation require the licensee to censor, alter, or in any
manner affect or control the subject matter of any such broadcast and
the licensee may not in his own discretion exercise any such censorship
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sonable to frustrate that intent by imposing liability on a broadcaster
who complied with that section.25
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the radio broadcaster who
provides an opportunity for a qualified senatorial candidate to reply to
speeches by other candidates, as required by section 315, may not be
held liable for the candidate's defamatory statements.255 The Court held
that section 315, which required the broadcaster to make air time available
to competing political candidates, precluded the broadcaster's censor-
ship of their material and granted the broadcaster immunity from liability
for defamatory statements made by them.25 6
In situations in which the Communications Act is not directly
applicable, defamatory materials conveyed over a broadcaster's fa-
cilities generally have followed the analysis applied to to the written
press.
25 7
One difference between broadcast defamation and print defamation
has been the categorization of the allegedly injurious publication as
libel or slander. 258 The distinction originally was based on assumptions
authority .... [Slection 326 of the present act, which deals with the
question of censorship of radio communications by the Commission ...
makes clear that the Commission has absolutely no power of censorship
over radio communications and that it cannot impose any regulation or
condition which would interfere with the right of free speech by radio.
S. REP. No. 1567, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1948).
254. Farmers Union, 360 U.S. at 529-31.
255. Id. at 526-27, 535.
256. Id. at 529-35. At first glance this immunity seems similar to that of a
common carrier for defamatory communications transmitted via its facilities, as
the broadcaster appears to be a mere provider of technology. However, by the
terms of section 315, a broadcaster is not required to make its facilities available
to everyone. By not granting access to one candidate, the broadcaster can escape
the duty to grant access to all. A common carrier, however, must provide non-
selective, non-discriminatory access to all and thus cannot make a conscious choice
to remove itself from regulatory requirements.
257. See supra Part IV. A.1. for a discussion of defamation law and the written
press. For examples of cases applying traditional defamation law to the broadcast
media, see, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (deputy sheriff
claiming defamation by televised speech deemed a public official and thus must
demonstrate "actual malice" to recover damages); Walker v. Pulitzer Pub. Co.,
394 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1968) (Major Walker, claiming defamation by television
report of his role in civil rights incident, deemed public figure and thus must
demonstrate actual malice); Correia v. Santos, 191 Cal. App. 2d 844, 13 Cal. Rptr.
132 (1961) (manager of radio station liable for defamatory broadcast made by his
agent who was also announcer); Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938)(judge who allowed radio transmission of judicial proceedings immune from liability
for defamation); Miles v. Louis Wasmer, 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933) (writer
and announcer/editor held liable for defamatory advertisement read over radio).
258. For a discussion of the significance of this distinction in cases of broadcast
1985]
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regarding the intent, impact, permanence and geographical area of
dissemination of the defamatory communication.5 9 The greater po-
tential for harm posed by libel traditionally was believed to justify
its broader scope of liability. 260
defamation, see infra notes 259, 260. See also Veeder, The History and Theory
of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 569-71 (1903); RESTATEMENT-
TORTS, supra note 21, § 568(1), (2) ("Libel consists of the publication of defamatory
matter by written or printed words . . . . [S]lander consists of the publication of
defamatory matter by spoken words . ... ).
259. It was assumed that a writing was more deliberately made than an oral
statement; a writing had a greater impact on the eye than words had on the ear;
a writing was more permanent and reached a larger audience than did speech.
Note, Torts: Defamation: Libel-Slander Distinction: Extemporaneous Remarks Made
on Television Broadcast: Shor v. Billingsley, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 320, 322 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Libel-Slander Distinction].
260. Shor v. Billingsley, 4 Misc. 2d 857, 861, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476, 481 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County) (defamatory broadcast treated as libel rather than slander even though
no prepared script was used) (quoting Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 304, 73
N.E.2d 30, 34 (1947) (Fuld, J., concurring)), aff'd, 4 A.D.2d 1017, 169 N.Y.S.2d 416
(1st Dep't 1957) "Many things that are defamatory may be said with impunity through
the medium of speech. Not so, however, when speech is caught upon the wing and
transmuted into print. What gives sting to the writing is its permanence of form." Ostrowe
v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 39, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (1931) (Cardozo, C.J.). Thus, it was easier
for a plaintiff to maintain a libel cause of action. See Libel-Slander Distinction, supra
note 259, at 326.
The cause of action for slander generally requires demonstration of special
damages, usually of a pecuniary nature. "The requirement of proof of pecuniary
damages apparently developed from an ancient jurisdictional dispute between the
ecclesiastical courts and the common law courts (the latter requiring proof of some
'temporal' harm distinct from the mere 'spiritual' offense cognizable in the former.)"
Eaton, supra note 157, at 1356 n.22. If the injurious statement falls into one of
the four traditional, narrow categories of slander per se, a claim of general damages
will suffice. The categories of slander per- se are:
(a) an imputation that the plaintiff has committed a serious crime. Mullins
v. Brando, 13 Cal. App. 3d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 796, cert. denied, 403
U.S. 923 (1970) (allegation that defendant stated on television that police
department was "out to get the Black Panthers" and that member of
group was killed in a shoot-out with police stated a cause of action for
slander of officers who allegedly fired shot); Snowdon v. Pearl River Broad-
casting Co., 251 So. 2d 405, 411 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1971) (radio station
inviting public to call and speak freely without employing monitoring equip-
ment liable per se to plaintiff accused on broadcast of illicit sale and distribu-
tion of narcotics);
(b) an imputation that the plaintiff has a loathsome disease, Williams
v. Holdredge, 22 Barb. [N.Y.] 396 (1854);
(c) an imputation damaging to the plaintiff's business, trade or profession,
White v. Valenta, 234 Cal. App. 2d 243, 44 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1965)
(defendant who uttered slanderous remarks within camera and microphone
range while plaintiff was delivering live advertisement for his business
held liable without proof of special damages);
(d) an imputation of unchastity in a woman, Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp.,
538 F.2d 588, 591 (4th Cir. 1976) (implication of an extra-marital affair
is intrinsically defamatory and no proof of injury is required).
See RESTATEMENT-TORTS, supra note 21, §§ 571-74.
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The characteristics of modern media, however, tend to belie the
traditional assumptions regarding defamation . 6' The FCC require-
ment that licensees maintain manuscript, video tape or other per-
manent records of everything which is broadcast 62 puts the spoken
material into visible form, thereby destroying the libel/slander dis-
tinction .263
Although individual state laws remain inconsistent in this area,264
the Second Restatement of Torts characterizes all broadcast defa-
mation as libel. 265 Consequently, the requisites of evidence and the
recoverable damages generally are the same for defamation in the
broadcast and print media. 266
5. Regulation of Obscenity on Radio, Television and Cable
Obscenities which are published over the broadcast media are more
stringently restricted than those published by the printed press. 267
On the other hand, a showing of general damages is generally sufficient to
maintain an action for libel. See, e.g., Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 538 F.2d 588
(4th Cir. 1976) (defendant's newspaper reported a legal dispute between plaintiff
and his girlfriend; plaintiff's wife left him following publication of the article);
Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., [1901-02] Sess. Cas. 645 (Scot.2d Div.) 39 ScoT. L.
RPTR. 432 (1902) (defendant's newspaper twice reported that plaintiff had given
birth to twins; plaintiff had been married only one month and three months on
the respective dates of publication). However, libel per quod requires a showing
of special damages. Eaton, supra note 157, at 1360. Libel per quod is a statement
that is defamatory only if the third party recipient has extrinsic knowledge that
makes it so. Id. at 1354-55.
261. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 150, at 787-88.
262. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1800-73.1840 (1984).
263. The current market dominance of the broadcast media more closely resembles
the role of the 18th century press than does the often struggling press of today.
Thus, radio and television broadcasts would seem more analogous to the print
media for which libel laws were created than to the more intimate publications
addressed by slander laws. Accordingly, in cases of media defamation, courts have
held that an oral defamatory broadcast which is read from a prepared script is
libel rather than slander. Similar treatment is given to extemporaneous defamatory
statements. See Gearhart v. WSAZ, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Ky. 1957), aff'd, 254
F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1958); Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn.
605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955); Shor v. Billingsley, 4 Misc. 2d 857, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 4 A.D.2d 1017, 169 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1957).
264. Compare Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), appeal
dismissed, KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen, 290 U.S. 599 (1933); Coffey v.
Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934); Shor v. Billingsley,
4 Misc. 2d 857, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 4 A.D.2d 1017,
169 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1957), appeal denied, 5 A.D.2d 768, 170 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1958);
with Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (1948); Summit Hotel Co.
v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).
265. RESTATEMENT-TORTS, supra note 21, § 568A.
266. See supra note 260.
267. See supra notes 174-81 regarding standards for determining obscenity in the
print media.
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While printed obscenities are analyzed in accordance with the Miller
standards,2 6 broadcast obscenities are governed by federal statutes
which allow, and indeed require, an even more restrictive test. This
test was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Pacifica.2 69
In Pacifica, the Court upheld the FCC's prohibition of the broad-
cast,2 70 finding the material indecent under section 1464 of the Federal
Criminal Code. 271 The pervasive impact of the broadcast medium
was cited as the key to permitting the FCC such broad regulatory
authority .27
Obscene materials which are transmitted over the cable medium
fall into yet another regulatory category. 211 Under the new Cable
Communications Policy Act,2 74 federal standards and criminal pen-
268. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
269. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982), originally enacted as part of the Radio Act of
1927, supra note 91, became part of the Communications Act of 1934, supra notes
89-95 and accompanying text. In 1948 it was incorporated into the criminal code.
FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978). The statute punishes the utterance of
obscene, indecent or profane language which is published by means of radio
communication. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982). 47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(1)(D) (1982) allows
the FCC to suspend the license of an operator upon proof of transmission of
superfluous radio communications which contain profane or obscene words, language
or meaning. 47 C.F.R. § 73.4165 (1984) prohibits the broadcast of indecent language
over radio or television; 47 C.F.R. § 73.4170 (1984) prohibits the broadcast of
indecent lyrics over radio or television. The Supreme Court expanded the parameters
of permissible regulation of broadcasts which contain offensive material in Pacifica.
438 U.S. 726 (1978). The FCC, recognizing that the material was indecent rather
than obscene under the guidelines set forth in Miller, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and
therefore not without first amendment protection, drew upon the law of nuisance
in deciding that the licensee could be subject to sanctions for the broadcast. Pacifica
Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975), rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd,
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
270. 438 U.S. 726, 741 (reversing circuit court's holding, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C, Cir.
1977)).
271. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982). Indecency was defined as the failure to conform
to generally accepted standards of morality. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740
n.14. This definition of indecency points out the contrast to obscenity, which must
appeal to the prurient interest. The Court justified its limitation of first amendment
guarantees because of the broadcast media's uniquely pervasive nature and unique
accessibility to children. Id. at 748-50. Due to these characteristics, regulation of
indecency in broadcasting is permissible to the extent necessary to abate its nuisance
aspects. 438 U.S. at 750. The Court stated that context is critical in determining
the existence of a nuisance. " '[Njuisance may be merely a right thing in a wrong
place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.' " Id. (quoting Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 368 (1926)).
272. See supra note 271.
273. See infra notes 317 & 322 for a discussion of the application of obscenity
regulations to the cable medium.
274. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984).
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alties are established for the transmission of obscene materials via
cable.2 75 The Act also gives the local franchising authority the right
to regulate any cable service it deems obscene.2 76 This regulation is
a specific exemption from the Act's bar on local censorship or
control of editorial content.
277
C. Regulation of Common Carriers
Before focusing on the new electronic media, a brief examination
of the third media role model, the common carriers, is in order.
Common carriers are defined in the Communications Act 278 as those
engaged as common carriers for hire. 279 The Supreme Court, however,
has developed a significantly more instructive definition. In National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC (NARUC
I),20 a common carrier was defined as an individual or organization
that holds itself out as available to the public for hire, that provides
275. Id. § 2, 98 Stat. 2801. The FCC has proposed deletion of current rule 47
C.F.R. § 76.215 (1984), which prohibits origination cable operators from transmitting
obscene or indecent materials, because the rule has been superseded by the 1984
Cable Communication Act's criminal sanction (Section 639 of the Act). See 49
Fed. Reg. 48,772 (1984).
276. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2785 (1984) (section 612(h) of the Cable
Act).
277. Section 612 of the Cable Act, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2782; 49
Fed. Reg. 48,772 n.51 (1984). Ordinances and state laws which restrict or regulate
the transmission of obscene, indecent and offensive materials over cable technology
are under increasing attack by advocates of first amendment guarantees. For example,
a Miami city ordinance banned obscene or indecent material on cable. In Cruz v.
Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125, 132 (S.D. Fla. 1983), aff'd, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985),
a suit brought by a cable television viewer, such an ordinance was struck down because
it impinged not only on obscene but also indecent speech, a category which is entitled
to some constitutional protection. Id. at 130-31. Similar suits in other jurisdictions
are pending: McGhee v. Vernon Hills, 83-C-2486 (N.D. I11. 1984) (Vernon Hills,
Illinois); Gates v. Ney, C-1-83-0999 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (Cincinnati, Ohio). The Ferre
court held that indecent speech was protected despite the Pacifica holding which per-
mitted regulation of indecent speech in the conventional broadcast context. Cruz v.
Ferre, 571 F. Supp. at 131-32. Cable television allows viewing control by the subscriber.
Such control nullifies the problems of pervasiveness and accessibility inherent in broad-
cast television and radio which provided the rationale for the Pacifica prohibition
against indecent speech. The rationale in Pacifica is also inapplicable to cable broad-
casting in that the survival of a cable system depends on subscription sales. Finan-
cial necessity forces cable operators to provide the viewing public with acceptable
programming to stimulate sales and minimize requests for cancellation. See id. at
631-32.
278. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1934), as amended
by Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(1984).
279. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1982).
280. 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976) (NARUC 1).
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facilities thereby to all members of the public who choose to use
its services to transmit information of their own design,"8 ' and that
serves all members of the public indifferently, basing all decisions
on non-discriminatory factors. 2 2 The common carrier's responsibility
is to provide a communications "pipeline. ' 283
1. Rate and Structural Regulation
Communications common carriers are regulated under Title II of
the Communications Act.284 After obtaining an FCC sanctioned fran-
chise, a carrier is "permitted to accrue revenues sufficient to cover
all reasonable operating expenses, the cost of acquiring capital, and
281. 525 F.2d at 640, 642; see also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S.
689, 701 (1979); Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 254 (1958).
The original rationale for regulation of common carriers was that they took on a
quasi-public character when they held themselves out as offering their services to
the public in general. NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 640. This role, coupled with the
general lack of care exercised by most carriers over the safety of their carriage,
justified the imposition of an "insurer" standard of care upon the common carriers.
Id. Under this rule, they were absolutely liable for any damage to their carriage,
other than that caused by an act of God, warfare, or similar forces majeures. Id.
at 640-41. The late nineteenth century saw the imposition of price and service
regulations on the carriers as a result, in part, of their monopoly status. Id. Despite
constitutional challenges, these regulations have been upheld. See, e.g., Ambassador,
Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 317, reh'g denied 325 U.S. 896 (1945) (FCC granted
jurisdiction over carriers to determine rates, services, charges, practices, classifi-
cations and regulations in connection with carriers' communication services); Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (establishing constitutionality of federal regulation
of industries which affect public interest).
282. See generally TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM, supra note 77, at 75-107; Geller
& Lampert, Cable, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 32 CATH. U.L.
REV. 603, 621 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Geller & Lampert]; Harrison, Public
Utilities in the Marketplace of Ideas: A "Fairness" Solution for a Competitive
Imbalance, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 43 (1982); Cosson, Development of Regulation of
Common Carrier Communications, 28 FED. COM. L.J. 132 (1975).
283. In re Amendment of Parts 1, 2, 21 and 43 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations to Provide for Licensing and Regulation of Common Carrier Radio
Stations in the Multipoint Distribution Service (Report and Order), 45 F.C.C.2d
616, 618 (1974). This pipeline or "conduit" role of the common carrier, along
with its monopoly status, are the bases for all carrier regulation. The pipeline
aspect affords the carrier immunity from prosecution for defamation over its lines.
See infra note 303 and accompanying text; see also Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360
U.S. 525 (1959) (immunity of broadcaster from defamation when acting merely as
conduit for required political messages); Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc.,
556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977) (immunity of newspaper
from defamation liability when merely acting as conduit for communication of
reported accusation by a responsible speaker).
284. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1982).
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a fair rate of return on its communications investments.""2 5 Such
carriers are required to file schedules of all charges, classifications,
practices and regulations affecting their charges with the FCC which
may examine and change them when it believes them to be unrea-
sonable or unjust.8 6 Common carriers are subject to rate of return
and rate base regulations, which define their allowable charges and
permissible profits,8 7 and must offer their services subject to gov-
ernment tariff.2"8 Common carriers must obtain certificates of public
convenience 2 9 prior to constructing, expanding or terminating any
line of communication and must not discriminate unreasonably against
users of their services. 290 The rate and service requirements imposed
on these carriers under the Communications Act reflect the view
that their natural monopoly status justifies government control of
their business activities.29'
This position, and the resultant statutory requirements, accord
with common carrier laws which long predate the Communications
Act. 292 While conventional telephone and telegraph services, as well
285. The Computer Inquiries, supra note 98, at 59; see 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203,
204, 205, 220 (1982).
286. 47 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 205, 214(d) (1982).
287. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-205 (1982).
288. 47 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205 (1982); see Phonetele, Inc. v. AT&T, 664 F.2d 716,
721-23 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing tariffs imposed by 47 U.S.C. § 203(a)).
289. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1982); see General Tel. Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390 (D.C.
Cir.) (holding that section 214 applies to construction of community antenna televi-
sion or cable facilities), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
290. General Tel. Co., 413 F.2d at 395, see also 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1982), which
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or
unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regu-
lations, facilities, or services for or in connection with like communication
service, directly or indirectly, by any means or device, or to make or
give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
person, class of persons, or locality, or to subject any particular person,
class of persons, or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage.
Id.
291. NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 640-42. See generally United States v. RCA, 358
U.S. 334, 346-50 (1959); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Independent Postal
Sys. of Am., 470 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1972). But see Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 712 (10th Cir. 1980) (dissenting opinion)
(CATV is not a natural monopoly), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
292. A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 3-19 (1970); see Phonetele, Inc.
v. AT&T, 664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 959 U.S. 1145 (1983); Mid-
Texas Communication Sys. v. AT&T, 615 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 618
F.2d 1389, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (upholding ability of the FCC to regulate
rates, the financial integrity of the carrier, network safety and efficiency, the proper
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as the more recent microwave and satellite technologies,2 93 are in-
cluded under the common carrier umbrella, 294 the regulatory role
model is the railways of the nineteenth century.
295
2. Inadequacy of the Railroad Model
Lower costs and widespread accessibility to electronic communi-
cation have substantially eroded the validity of the railroad role model
for both common carriers and the new media.2 96 As the FCC noted in
Computer 11,297 in which common carrier regulations were specifically
held inapplicable to "enhanced" 291 "compunications, 299 services,"'
communications and data processing technologies have become
intertwined so thoroughly as to produce a form different from
any expressly recognized in the Communications Act[3° ' .... T]o
subject enhanced services to a common carrier scheme of regulation
because of the presence of an indiscriminate offering to the public
would regulate the dynamics of computer technology in this area.30 2
Similarly, the industry monopolization upon which many of the
common carrier regulations were grounded does not appear to
pertain to the dynamic telecommunications market. Consumer de-
mand and foreign competition are now regulating rates and organizations
as effectively as nineteenth century tariffs.
allocation of the rate burden and the future needs of both the carrier and the public
in order to determine the "public interest" and public convenience and necessity,
all of which are traditional common carriage objectives). See 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
293. 47 C.F.R. § 25.103(c)(2) (1984).
294. 47 U.S.C. §§ 20A-224 (1982).
295. TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM, supra note 77, at 95-96.
296. See Martin, supra note 27, at 357, 358 (economic railway type regulation
should not be applied to non-monopolistic telecommunications). See generally TE-
LECOMMUNICATIONs AMERICA supra note 77, at 93; Comment, Of Common Carriage
and Cable Access: Deregulation of Cable Television by the Supreme Court, 34
FED. COM. L.J. 167 (1982).
297. 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 669 (1980); see supra notes 108-115.
298. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
299. The Computer Inquiries, supra note 98, at 63-64. "Compunications," a term
coined by Anthony Oettinger, Director of the Program in Information Resources
Policy at Harvard University, has been used to describe the new information services
which integrate data processing and telecommunications. Id.
300. Computer II, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 703-04.
301. Id. at 701. See generally Bigelow, Introduction to Symposium: Computers
in Law and Society, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 371, 374-75 (1977) (discussing difficulty
of distinguishing, for regulatory purposes, data communications and computer produc-
tion and use).




Because their fundamental characteristic is nondiscriminatory serv-
ice, common carriers may not base decisions regarding message
transmission on the identity of the customer or the content of the
message. Accordingly, carriers are immune from liability for message
content, and libel and slander actions are inapplicable against them.3 3
This degree of responsibility is quite different from that of the
press3°0 or broadcaster 05 who is expected to oversee transmission
content and may be held responsible for the material therein.
Unlike the print and broadcast media, common carriers have been
subject to only the most limited kind of first amendment analysis.
This detachment results not so much from a preferred status under
the first amendment but rather from an unarticulated but historical
acknowledgement that the telegraph did not possess the same claim
to first amendment protection as did the press.3° One noted scholar
has offered an appealing economic rationale fo this curiosity. In
Technologies of Freedom, Dr. Ithiel de o Pool suggests that the
high cost of transmittal over early telegraph systems precluded uti-
lization of the medium for anything other than terse news and
that the common carrier model was considered for radio regulation. 67 CONG. REC.
12501-05 (1926). The intended Radio Act provision, requiring a broadcaster to
accept any service requested without discrimination, was viewed as excessively
burdensome on the medium and was deleted in the final bill. Compare H.R. 9971,
69th Cong., 2d Sess., 67 CONG. REC. 4956 (1926) with Pub. L. No. 632 § 18, 44
Stat. 1170 (1927). See infra note 308.
303. See, e.g., Von Meysenburg v. Western Union Tel Co., 54 F. Supp. 100
(S.D. Fla. 1944) (telegraph company's immunity from liability for transmission of
libelous message must be broad enough to enable company to render its public
service efficiently and with dispatch).
304. See supra notes 133-81. But see Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc.,
556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977) (publisher may be held responsible for accusations
published by him where he has "espous[ed] or concurs in the charges ... or
[where he] deliberately distorts [the] statements . .. ").
305. See supra notes 186-277. But see Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525,
531 (1959) (immunity for broadcaster is implicit in section 315 of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934).
306. TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM, supra note 77, at 102-04; see FCC v. RCA
Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 89-90 (1953) (Secretary of Commerce and
Labor authorized by Radio Act of 1912 to license radio operators; Radio Act of
1927 gave Federal Radio Commission "wide licensing and regulatory powers over
interstate and foreign commerce," provided that it [was] "guided by the 'public
interest, convenience or necessity' "); Farmers' & Merchants' Coop. Telephone Co.
v. Boswell Tel. Co., 187 Ind. 371, 119 N.E. 513, 515-16 (1918) (because public
welfare requires adequate telephone service, state may regulate such service; section
97 of Public Utility Act not "repugnant to section 1 . . . of the Bill of Rights").
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business communiques. °7 Hence, the telegraph was not viewed as
a vehicle for transmitting protected speech and first amendment
issues were irrelevant. 08 The Supreme Court's recent obviation of
the distinction between unprotected commercial and protected ex-
pressive speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens and Consumers Council, Inc.,3°9 merely highlights the lon-
gevity of the distinction which may have justified the historical
controls imposed on common carriers.
V. Regulation of the New Electronic Media
A. Teletext
If prior models and regulations are inapplicable, how then should
this new technology be treated? It does not fit squarely-into the cate-
gories of print media, broadcasting or common carrier.310 Neverthe-
less, in accordance with the FCC's Communications Act mandate,"'
307. TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM, supra note 77, at 91.
308. Id. The Supreme Court, in fact, did not rule until 1976 that commercial
speech was within the protective ambit of the first amendment. Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Thus, while various forms of electronic publishing, particularly on-line information
services, may fall within the parameters of commercial, as opposed to expressive,
speech, this distinction is probably not viable with regard to first amendment
guarantees.
The history of the Radio Act indicates that, initially, the medium was not viewed
as an organ of expression either. See supra note 302. It was viewed as a facility
somewhat comparable to the telegraph or telephone. Although the final version of
H.R. 9971 did not include common carrier-type regulation for the radio broadcasters,
the medium is still constrained by the original view that it is a facility for dis-
semination rather than expression. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broad-
caster: Reflections On Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 785 (1972).
Accordingly, under the Communications Act, the public interest standard of carrier
regulation has been applied to broadcasters who are permitted to monopolize a
particular frequency solely by virtue of their government-awarded license. See
Cosmopolitan Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 581 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The
Act, however, makes it clear that broadcasters are not common carriers. FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 704 (1979); see supra notes 281-83 and
accompanying text. See infra note 356.
309. 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); see Nadel, supra note 9, at 184 n.82.
310. See generally Videotex Symposium, supra note 10; Geller & Lampert, supra,
note 282, at 610-22.
311. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Section 151 provides that "[ffor the purpose of
regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio
so as to make available, so far as possible, . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide,
and world-wide- wire and radio communication service ... there is created a
commission to be known as 'Federal Communications Commission.' " Id. § 151; see
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it must be encouraged. 12 If new services such as teletext3"3 and
videotext 1 4 provide a "catalyst for change from the present regulatory
scheme," '315 the direction of that change will be of critical importance.
The new media provide a compelling opportunity to create a coherent
theory of the first amendment, one which would embrace both print
and electronic communications and which would respond to the
technology and economics of the coming century.31 6
As forms of electrical communication, teletext and videotext clearly
fall within the FCC's jurisdictional ambit.317 Even though an activity
falls within its subject matter jurisdiction, however, the Commission's
regulatory powers are not without constraints. 18 Indeed, the FCC
has held that in certain instances involving new technology it has
the prerogative not to regulate at all. 319
The most important recent utilization of this prerogative occurred
in the 1983 FCC Teletext Order.320 The Commission authorized VBI
teletext3 2' as an "ancillary" broadcast medium3 22 and excluded it
also 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1982); Computer II, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 1324.
312. See, e.g., Amend. of Parts 2, 73 and 76, 53 RAD. REG. 2d 1309, 1311-12
(1983).
313. See supra notes 29-53 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 54-74 and accompanying text.
315. The New Video Marketplace, supra note 10, at 574-75 n.268 (quoting
statement of FCC Commissioner Anne Jones in FCC News Release, Rep. No.
07762 (Mar. 5, 1981)).
316. See, e.g., H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-6 (1966).
317. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172 (1968) (citing
S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934)). In Southwestern Cable, the
regulatory jurisdiction of the FCC over the new cable technology was at issue.
The Court acknowledged that cable television did not fit neatly into the broadcasting
model of Title III, 392 U.S. at 167-69, or the carrier model of Title II of the
Communications Act. Id. at 169 n.29. Noting that it could not construe the Act
so restrictively, the Court held that "[niothing in the language of § 152(a), in the
surrounding language, or in the Act's history or purposes limits the Commission's
authority to [regulate] those activities and forms of communication that are specifically
described by the Act's [other] provisions." Id. at 172.
318. Computer II, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 702. The principal limitation
upon the FCC's exercise of its statutory powers is that regulation must be "directed
at protecting or promoting a statutory purpose." Id.
319. See, e.g., HBO v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 829 (1977).
320. 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1309 (1983).
321. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
322. Amend. of Parts 2, 73 and 76, 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) at 1322; see also
Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 178 (cable regulated under FCC authority over
those media which are "reasonably ancillary to the effective . . . regulation of ...
broadcasting"). Accordingly, the FCC has authority under 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) to
issue regulations in the cause of public convenience, interest and necessity. Id.
19851
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from existing content and service regulations.3 23 Noting its statutory
obligation to promulgate policies which are responsive to new com-
munications technologies and to encourage rather than to frustrate
their development, the Commission decided to authorize teletext
under an open market approach. Thus, the FCC authorized full
service and low power television teletext in which the broadcast
licensee is free to choose both the kind of service offered,3 24 and
the technical standards utilized. 25 The only limitation is a proscription
against system interference with regular broadcasting or the signals
of nonbroadcast radio stations.3 26
Additionally, while focusing on the ancillary nature of this service,
the FCC decided that teletext would not be required to promote
the public service programming obligations of a television broadcaster
nor would the political broadcast obligations of sections 312(a)(7)
or 315 of the Communications Act327 be applied to teletext trans-
missions.3 2s By acknowledging that teletext was a form of "electronic
newspaper" 3 29 which was fundamentally distinguishable from tra-
ditional broadcasting, the Commission was able to justify exempting
it from the burdens of the Fairness Doctrine. 30 Similarly, service
guidelines for news and advertising, 3 1 which had constrained radio
and television broadcasters until the most recent spate of deregu-
lation, were determined to be inapplicable.33 2
On January 24, 1985, the Commission reaffirmed its 1983 Teletext
Report and Order (1985 Reconsideration).33 3 Noting the affinity be-
tween teletext and the press, the FCC declined to reconsider the
323. Amend. of Parts 2, 73 and 76, 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 1322.
324. Id. at 1319.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Section 312(a)(7) of the Act allows the FCC to revoke a station's license
for "willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase
of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally
qualified candidate for Federal elective office . . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982).
Section 315 is the codification of the Fairness Doctrine. See supra notes 196 & 244.
328. Amend. of Parts 2, 73 and 76, 53 RA. REG. 2d (P & F), at 1323.
329. Id. at 1322-23.
330. Id. at 1323-24. "Indeed, it seems probable that teletext - a textual means
of communication primarily not employing sound and pictures - more closely
resembles, and will largely compete with, other print communications media such
as newspapers and magazines." Id. at 1324.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1312, 1321.
333. Amend. of Parts 2, 73 and 76 (Memorandum Opinion and Order), 57 RAD.
REG. 2d (P & F) 842, 843 (1985).
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applicability of either common carrier or broadcast content regulation
to the medium. 34 The 1983 Order was modified, however, to the
extent that public broadcasters henceforth would be permitted to
use their teletext facilities on a remunerative basis as an alternative
source of financing. 335
On the same day, the Commission also authorized television sta-
tions to make expanded use of the VBI, permitting commercial and
noncommercial television licensees to transmit dataprocessed infor-
mation or any other digital or analog communication over their
vertical blanking interval. 3 6 Such services are considered "ancillary"
programming . 37
The FCC's decision also provides that cable systems generally will
not be required to carry television broadcasters' VBI transmissions,
although a full resolution of the relationship between cable and VBI
was deferred pending conclusion of the FCC's television aural sub-
carrier proceedings.33 8
The 1983 Teletext Order and the 1985 Reconsideration, while
clarifying some issues in electronic publishing, dealt only with one-
way VBI transmissions.3 9 Teletext is capable of being transmitted
over various media other than broadcast VBI, 340 however, and vi-
334. 57 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 846.
335. Id. at 845.
336. Id. at 834-35. In March, 1985, the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) signed
an agreement with International MarketNet, a joint venture of IBM and Merrill
Lynch, to develop a high speed data delivery service in which financial information
would be downloaded into computers through the VBI of PBS member stations.
A significant infusion of new funds into PBS is expected to result. BROADCASTING,
Mar. 4, 1985, at 88.
337. In re Amendment of Parts 2, 73 and 76 of the Commission's Rules to
Authorize the Offering of Data Transmission Services on the Vertical Blanking
Interval by TV Station (Report and Order), 57 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 832, 835
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Amend. of Parts 2, 73 and 76 (Report and Order)].
338. Id. at 840. See infra note 354, discussing Cable Act provisions concerning
videotext.
339. Amend. of Parts 2, 73 and 76 (Report and Order), 57 RAD REG. 2d (P &
F), at 833. This is in accord with the original 1983 Teletext Order, 53 RAD. REG. 2d
(P & F), at 1331, in which the FCC held that, given the ancillary and discretionary
nature of teletext transmissions, the communications policy concerns underlying
cable mandatory carriage requirements, Cable Television Report and Order, 36
F.C.C.2d 143, 173, 24 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1501 (1972), were inapplicable.
Accordingly, cable television systems were not required to carry teletext services.
340. Amend. of Parts 2, 73 and 76 (Memorandum Opinion and Order), 57 RAD.
REG. 2d (P & F) 842, 843-44 (1985); Amend. of Parts 2, 73 and 76 (Report and
Order), 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1309, 1320 (1983). See supra note 34 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the VBI.
1985]
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
deotext, while primarily a telephone communication medium at pres-
ent, is expected to increasingly rely on cable technology in the coming
years.341 Although the FCC has not yet specifically addressed cable
teletext or videotext, except to bar local authorities from regulating
cable videotext as common carriage, it repeatedly has examined cable
technology in other areas during the past twenty years. 342
B. Cable
The FCC's authority over cable operations was first formally
recognized in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,343 in which
the Supreme Court held that the FCC's jurisdiction over all interstate
and foreign radio and wire communications included jurisdiction
over those facilities which were "reasonably ancillary" to its broad-
casting duties. 3" The limited holding in Southwestern Cable was
341. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
342. See infra note 354. See generally D. LE Duc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE
FCC: A CIsIs IN MEDIA CONTROL (1973).
343. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
344. Id. at 178. The Supreme Court did not express any view with respect to
the FCC's authority to regulate cable television under any other circumstances or
for any other purposes. The Court's opinion related to the precursor technology
of cable television, Community Antenna Television (CATV). Id. at 160-63. This
medium was defined as a system capable of receiving the signal of a television
broadcast station, amplifying it, transmitting it by cable or microwave, and ultimately
distributing it by wire to the receivers of its subscribers. Id. at 161 n.8. CATV
was found to perform two functions: the supplementing of broadcasting by enhancing
reception of local stations in adjacent areas; and the transmission to subscribers
of distant signals beyond the range of local antennae. Id. at 163. The Commission
adopted the term "cable television" in 1972. See United States v. Midwest Video
Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 651 n.3 (1972) (citing Report and Order on Cable Television
Service; Cable Television Relay Service, 37 Fed. Reg. 3252 n.9 (1972)).
CATV systems were first established on a non-commercial basis in 1949 and in
1950 as commercial ventures. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 162 & n.12. In the
late 1950's approximately fifty new systems were established each year, reaching
a total of 550 systems by 1959, serving 1.5-2 million people. Id. at 162. In 1959
the FCC completed an exhaustive survey of several auxilliary broadcasting services,
including CATV, and found that medium to be related to interstate commerce and
communication. Id. at 164. It determined to not regulate CATV at that point, but
recommended legislation which was never enacted. Id. at 164-65. Since 1960, the
FCC has gradually asserted its authority over CATV and in 1965 issued revised
rules which were applicable to cable and microwave carriage. Id. at 165-66. These
rules regulated local signals and provided for nonduplication of local programming.
Id.; see Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d
359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963); Notice of Inquiry and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 1 F.C.C.2d 453 (1965); CATV (Second Report & Order),
2 F.C.C.2d 725, 733-34 (1966) (holding that "CATV systems are engaged in interstate
communication by wire to which the provisions of the Communications Act are
applicable . . ."). Midwest Video I, discussed infra notes 345-46, was instituted
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expanded in United States v. Midwest Video Corp.3 45 (Midwest Video
1), which upheld the authority of the FCC to regulate cable pro-
gramming 346
The 1972 FCC Cable Rules and Regulations (Cable Rules)3 47 cod-
ified the Commission's previous ad hoc ownership, programming
and technical regulations. 48 The Cable Rules also specifically sub-
jected origination programming 49 cablecasters to the Fairness Doc-
trine as well as to the equal access and programming/record keeping
regulations which applied to radio and television broadcasters at that
time.350 Although most of the cable franchising regulations were
abrogated in 1977,111 when jurisdiction over this activity was delegated
to local authorities,35 2 many of the 1972 content and service re-
thirteen days after the FCC's adoption of the Second Report.
345. 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (Midwest Video I). This case should be distinguished
from a subsequent case involving the same parties, FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,
440 U.S. 689 (1979) (Midwest Video If).
346. At issue in Midwest Video I was whether the Commission's program orig-
ination rule was ancillary to broadcasting. 406 U.S. at 662-63. That rule required
cable television systems with 3,500 or more subscribers, which carried the signal
of any broadcast television station, to originate programming and make their facilities
available for local programs other than automated services. Id. at 653-54. The Supreme
Court held that the programming origination rule fell within the FCC's jurisdiction
because it satisfied the "reasonably ancillary to broadcasting" test, 406 U.S. 649,
662, set forth in Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
The Commission, however, never enforced the mandatory origination regulations,
but chose to conduct new proceedings which ultimately resulted in the 1972 man-
datory access rules contained in the Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d
143, 240-41 (1972). The mandatory origination rule was formally rescinded in 1974,
39 Fed. Reg. 43,302, and equipment availability rules were instituted and merged
with the two year old access requirements. This precipitated the second challenge
by Midwest Video, Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978),
aff'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (Midwest Video I).
Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. at 680, viewed
CATV as a common carrier which had no more control over message content than
the telephone company. He vehemently opposed the FCC's program origination
rule as exceeding the Commission's ability to regulate and noted that its enforcement
would force a carrier CATV system to become a broadcaster against its will. See
Community Communications Co. v City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.
1981), for the acknowledgement that the first amendment protects cable television;
See also Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968) (microwave
CATV covered under Communications Act without violating first amendment).
347. 24 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1501 (1972); Cable Television Report and Order,
36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1-.617 (1984).
348. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1-76.617 (1984).
349. 47 C.F.R. § 76.205 (1984).
350. 47 C.F.R. § 76.209 (1984).
351. Report and Order, 66 F.C.C.2d 380, 41 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 885 (1977).
352. Id. The New York State Commission on Cable Television promulgates Cable
Rules in New York which govern the local franchises.
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quirements still remain353 as modified by the provisions of the 1984
Cable Communications Policy Act.354
In 1979, the Supreme Court limited FCC jurisdiction over cable
television in Midwest Video H11.3 The Court held that Commission
regulations which required cable operators to provide access channels
to government, public, educational or lease use were beyond the
FCC's "reasonably ancillary" jurisdiction, since such common car-
rier-type restrictions could not be imposed on cablecasters consistently
with the Communications Act. 56 Thus, the cable medium could only
be regulated by the FCC in relation to its traditional broadcasting
jurisdiction.3 7 To the extent that the medium affects the FCC's
historical obligations with respect to broadcasting,358 cable falls within
353. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1-.617 (1984).
354. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat.
2779 (1984). This new cable act reaffirms the ability of local governments (franchising
authorities) to regulate cable through their franchising processes while establishing
federal guidelines to guide the local efforts. See Pub. L. No. 98-549, §§ 601-626,
98 Stat. 2780-91. The law also sets up new rules for franchise renewals, cable
rates, program packages, system access, ownership, female and minority employment,
subscriber privacy, and theft of programming services. Id. The act also provides
that local authorities may prohibit the transmission of obscene cable services which
are not otherwise protected by the first amendment, id. § 639, and requires operators
to provide subscribers with "lock-boxes" to restrict childrens' viewing of cable
programming upon request. Id. § 624(d)(2)(A); see supra note 277.
In order to address the growing use of cable to provide two-way information
and video communications, the act provides that local authorities may not regulate
two-way video programming cablecasters, including cable videotext, as common
carriers, id. § 602(5), (6), but that informational tariffs may be required by the
states or the FCC. Id. § 621(d)(1); see Cable Communications Policy Act Rules,
58 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1 (1985) (adopted by Commission to implement 1984
Act).
While the Act is viewed as a boon to the economic prospects of the cable
industry and the local authorities whose regulatory power is now clear, the cod-
ification of the franchise process may ultimately work to the detriment of the first
amendment claims of cable operators who claim the title of electronic heir to the
unregulated press. See generally Wiley and Swanson, New Cable Act Should Help
Stabilize Industry, Legal Times, Nov. 12, 1984, at 20.
355. Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. 689 (1979), aff'g 571 F.2d 1025 (1978).
356. Id. at 705. The Supreme Court held that the FCC had " 'strain[ed] the outer
limits' of [its] authority," id. at 708 (quoting Midwest Video II, 406 U.S. at 676
(Burger, C.J., concurring in part)), and set aside the Commission's mandatory ac-
cess, channel construction and equipment availability rules. Essential to this holding
was the fact that the FCC had failed to show cven the slightest nexus between
the regulations and its authority over broadcasting. The Court thus held that the
FCC could not impose on cable systems that which it was specifically prohibited
from imposing on broadcasters: the burden of common carrier status. Id. at 701,
705, 709; see also ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (1975) (Commission should be
accorded flexibility in dealing with cable television and its jurisdiction should not
be rigidly compartmentalized into licensing and public utility regulation).
357. Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 708.
358. See supra notes 182-277 and accompanying text.
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the ancillary jurisdiction of the FCC.359 Whether cable videotext or
VBI teletext will be viewed as ancillary to broadcasting is not yet
clear. What is becoming increasingly evident, however, is the strength
of the argument against such a construction and the need to formulate
a coherent regulatory policy which does not depend on technical
distinctions between the cable, broadcasting, common carriage and
print media.
VI. Conclusion
Current control of electronic publishing is unfocused. The FCC's
1983 Teletext Order3 60 specifically addressed VBI teletext, deemed it
ancillary to broadcasting and refrained from imposing content, struc-
tural or technical controls. 361 This order covers over-the-air and,
presumably, cable teletext, both of which use the narrowband VB.
No pronouncements have been made yet concerning broadband,
full-channel teletext,3 62 which certainly could be viewed as more of
a broadcast medium than the isolated VBI. Alternatively, MDS363
or DBS316 teletext may be regulated as common carriers. 65 Telephone
videotext may also fall within this regulatory ambit. The uses of
all these systems, however, most closely resemble those of the print
media, a fact specifically acknowledged by the FCC in its 1983
Teletext Order. 66
The current regulatory fragmentation of the electronic publishing
media makes no sense from either a legal or technical point of view.
From the legal perspective, the present ad hoc approach appears to
value form over substance. Viewed from the technical perspective,
the existing regulatory alternatives hinder industry development by
creating an ambiguous future for a technology sorely in need of
economic security. The present framework permits the arrest of a
Thomas Tcimpidis3 67 and creates nationwide confusion about his
359. Midwest Video 11, 440 U.S. at 708.
360. 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1309 (1983); see supra notes 320-32 and accom-
panying text.
361. 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 1324.
362. See supra notes 41-42.
363. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 278-309 and accompanying text.
366. 1983 Teletext Order, 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F), at 1322. Indeed, Richard
Wiley, former chairman of the FCC, has called teletext a "wireless newspaper."
Statements of R. Wiley before the ABA Forum Comm. on Communications Law,
the Lawyer and the New Videomarketplace III, Feb. 22, 1985.
367. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text. Ultimately, the Los Angeles
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legal liability. It also leaves open questions about technical standards
and permissible corporate structure and ownership, which are critical
to any potential market entrant. This is unacceptable.
A preferable alternative would be to view all electronic publishing
as a single communications medium regardless of the method of
transmission. It is clear that the present communications environment
has far surpassed that envisioned by the drafters of the 1934 Com-
munications Act . 68 The basis for distinguishing between typeset and
electronically transmitted communications is not viable in 1985. The
regulatory underpinnings are without merit.
Scarcity, even if a legitimate concept in 1934, certainly is not a
valid regulatory consideration today. The exploding number of broad-
cast radio and television stations, cable systems and satellite alter-
natives offer the American audience an array of voices unimaginable
in 1934. Switching 369 and multiplexing3 7° technologies further increase
the number of possible communicators at any single instant.
While the radio spectrum may be limited in a cosmic sense, the
only relevant limitation to its present utilization is economic rather than
physical.37' However, the Supreme Court has held that economic
scarcity is not a valid basis for regulation.3 2
Similarly, the electronic media of 1985 cannot be said to so pervade
our lives that we are captive audiences in our homes.3 73 Even if the
Pacifica rationale was ever valid, it is not applicable to teletext and
videotext. While rapidly advancing, modern technology has not yet
evolved to the stage where it can intrude uninvited into our living
rooms. A conscious decision to subscribe to each separate system
is required, and sophisticated technologies are necessary to access
and use these media. We must spend a lot of money and achieve
a modicum of computer literacy before even the most user-friendly
City Attorney's Office decided that it had insufficient evidence to continue to
prosecute the case against Tcimpidis. The case was dismissed "with prejudice."
POPULAR COMPUTING, June, 1985, at 144. Although Tcimpidis' lawyer was pleased
with the outcome, the central issue of sysop liability has not been resolved. Id.
368. See supra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 56.
370. See supra note 43 discussing multiplexor technology vis-a-vis the FM sub-
carrier frequency.
371. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 191, at 221-26 (FCC's allocation scheme
perpetrates spectrum scarcity beyond any intrinsic physical limitations).
372. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir.) ("scarcity which is
the result solely of economic conditions is apparently insufficient to justify even limited
government intrusion into the [flirst [almendment rights of the conventional press"),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
373. See supra notes 211-24 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XIII
ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING
systems are available to us. We can bar our children from undesirable
material through the use of lock-boxes and confidential log-on IDs.
We can keep the electronic publishing medium out of our homes
if we do not choose to be exposed to it. We are not captives.
Electronic publishing is not broadcasting. Neither, however, is it
common carriage,3 74 providing universal service and open access to
all comers. While MDS and telephone facilities have been held to
be common carriers, the use of these media in connection with
electronic publishing ventures, which require individualized subscrip-
tion and service, does not appear to constitute carriage under the
Supreme Court's NARUC definitions.171 Indeed, the nation's premier
carrier, AT&T, is precluded by the terms of the MFJ from presently
entering the electronic publishing business.116
Electronic publishing is provided, however, by a wide range of
other corporate and individual entities, none of whom evidence the
market dominance or monopoly status which historically justified
the regulation of common carriers.3 7  Absent the historic or economic
justification for the imposition of common carrier regulation, it would
be highly unreasonable to shoehorn the electronic publishers into
this constraining mold. Additionally, if the FCC's current open market
approach 3"' to the new technology is successful, it should preclude
further monopolization and thus negate the primary basis for carrier
regulation . 79
Because the broadcast and carrier models are not applicable, an
alternative framework must be designed to accomodate the new
media. This framework must acknowledge the current technology,
as well as the open market approach now favored by the FCC as
essential to the economic development of the new media.8 0
Recent history has provided a trial balloon for this new framework
in the regulation of the cable medium. This medium, while falling
within the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction, is clearly heading towards
a first amendment position which is more analogous to the press
than to the other regulated methods of communication. This is
appropriate and should be paralleled by the newer electronic com-
munications.
374. See supra notes 278-309 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (AT&T Consent Decree).
377. See supra notes 278-309 and accompanying text.
378. See, e.g., 1983 Teletext Order, 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1309.
379. Id.
380. Digital Termination Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 360, 389-90 (1981); Cellular Com-
munications Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 503 (1981) ("We are committed ... to a policy
of encouraging multiple entry").
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The acknowledgement of cable's increasing right to first amend-
ment privileges is based, in large part, on the voluntary and indi-
vidualized nature of its subscription.38" ' This rationale is even more
appropriate to the electronic publishing ventures. In this respect,
cable and electronic publishing are the newspapers of the twenty-
first century and must be accorded their appropriate freedoms.382
The burdens which cable technology allegedly place on public
resources, however, cannot be said to apply to the broad spectrum
of electronic publishing media. Accordingly, franchise requirements,
which were imposed on cable operators and legislated under the new
Act, are not relevant to electronic publishers. In this respect, the
new media must be viewed according to their function rather than
through their methods of distribution, and must be treated as a
wireless press. When viewed in this manner, the regulatory mandate
is clear: Congress shall make no laws abridging ... the freedom
of the press.
381. Nat'l L.J., Mar. 25, 1985, at 23, col. 1.
382. On July 19, 1985, a unanimous three judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals
in Washington held that Cable "must-carry" rules were unconstitutional. Quincy Cable
T.V., Inc. v. FCC, No. 83-1283, (D.C. Cir. July 19, 1985). These rules, the centerpiece
of FCC cable legislation for twenty years, required cable operators to carry local broad-
cast signals. In holding the rules too broad to pass first amendment muster, the court
forged "a vital link in the chain of decisions establishing cable's status as a First Amend-
ment speaker and electronic publisher." BROADCASTING, July 22, 1985 at 31, 32
(statements of Jim Mooney, president of National Cable Television Association).
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